a denomination of Protestants who reject all church
government, except that of a single congregation under the direction of
one pastor, with their elders, assistants, or managers. In one
particular, the Congregationalists differ from the Independents: the
former invite councils, which, however, only tender their advice; but
the latter are accustomed to decide all difficulties within themselves.
See INDEPENDENTS.
CONSCIENCE is that principle, power, or faculty within us, which decides
on the merit or demerit of our own actions, feelings, or affections,
with reference to the rule of God’s law. It has been called the _moral
sense_ by Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Hutcheson. This appellation has been
objected to by some, but has been adopted and defended by Dr. Reid, who
says, “The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external
senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely
upon it.” He therefore considers conscience as an original faculty of
our nature, which decides clearly, authoritatively, and instantaneously,
on every object that falls within its province. “As we rely,” says he,
“upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the
colours and figures of the bodies about us, we have the same reason to
rely, with security, upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our
conscience, with regard to what we ought and ought not to do.” But Dr.
Reid is surely unfortunate in illustrating the power of conscience by
the analogy of the external senses. With regard to the intimations
received through the organs of sense, there can be no difference of
opinion, and there can be no room for argument. They give us at once
correct information, which reasoning can neither invalidate nor confirm.
But it is surely impossible to say as much for the power of conscience,
which sometimes gives the most opposite intimations with regard to the
simplest moral facts, and which requires to be corrected by an accurate
attention to the established order of nature, or to the known will of
God, before we can rely with confidence on its decisions. It does not
appear, that conscience can with propriety be considered as a principle
distinct from that which enables us to pronounce on the general merit or
demerit of moral actions. This principle, or faculty, is attended with
peculiar feelings, when we ourselves are the agents; we are then too
deeply interested to view the matter as a mere subject of reasoning; and
pleasure or pain are excited, with a degree of intensity proportioned to
the importance which we always assign to our own interests and feelings.
In the case of others, our approbation or disapprobation is generally
qualified, sometimes suspended, by our ignorance of the motives by which
they have been influenced; but, in our own case, the motives and the
actions are both before us, and when they do not correspond, we feel the
same disgust with ourselves that we should feel toward another, whose
motives we knew to be vicious, while his actions are specious and
plausible. But in our own case, the uneasy feeling is heightened in a
tenfold degree, because self-contempt and disgust are brought into
competition with the warmest self-love, and the strongest desire of
self-approbation. We have then something of the feelings of a parent,
who knows the worthlessness of the child he loves, and contemplates with
horror the shame and infamy which might arise from exposure to the
world.
2. Conscience, then, cannot be considered as any thing else than the
general principle of moral approbation or disapprobation applied to our
own feelings or conduct, acting with increased energy from the knowledge
which we have of our motives and actions, and from the deep interest
which we take in whatever concerns ourselves; nor can we think that they
have deserved well of morals or philosophy, who have attempted to deduce
our notions of right and wrong from any one principle. Various powers
both of the understanding and of the will are concerned in every moral
conclusion; and conscience derives its chief and most salutary influence
from the consideration of our being continually in the presence of God,
and accountable to him for all our thoughts, words, and actions. A
conscience well informed, and possessed of sensibility, is the best
security for virtue, and the most awful avenger of wicked deeds; an
ill-informed conscience is the most powerful instrument of mischief; a
squeamish and ticklish conscience generally renders those who are under
its influence ridiculous.
_Hic murus aheneus esto,
Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa._
[Let a consciousness of innocence, and a fearlessness of any accusation,
be thy brazen bulwark.]
3. The rule of conscience is the will of God, so far as it is made known
to us, either by the light of nature, or by that of revelation. With
respect to the knowledge of this rule, conscience is said to be rightly
informed, or mistaken; firm, or wavering, or scrupulous, &c. With
respect to the conformity of our actions to this rule when known,
conscience is said to be good or evil. In a moral view, it is of the
greatest importance that the understanding be well informed, in order to
render the judgment or verdict of conscience a safe directory of
conduct, and a proper source of satisfaction. Otherwise, the judgment of
conscience may be pleaded, and it has actually been pleaded, as an
apology for very unwarrantable conduct. Many atrocious acts of
persecution have been perpetrated, and afterward justified, under the
sanction of an erroneous conscience. It is also of no small importance,
that the sensibility of conscience be duly maintained and cherished; for
want of which men have often been betrayed into criminal conduct without
self-reproach, and have deluded themselves with false notions of their
character and state. See MORAL OBLIGATION.
government, except that of a single congregation under the direction of
one pastor, with their elders, assistants, or managers. In one
particular, the Congregationalists differ from the Independents: the
former invite councils, which, however, only tender their advice; but
the latter are accustomed to decide all difficulties within themselves.
See INDEPENDENTS.
CONSCIENCE is that principle, power, or faculty within us, which decides
on the merit or demerit of our own actions, feelings, or affections,
with reference to the rule of God’s law. It has been called the _moral
sense_ by Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Hutcheson. This appellation has been
objected to by some, but has been adopted and defended by Dr. Reid, who
says, “The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external
senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely
upon it.” He therefore considers conscience as an original faculty of
our nature, which decides clearly, authoritatively, and instantaneously,
on every object that falls within its province. “As we rely,” says he,
“upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the
colours and figures of the bodies about us, we have the same reason to
rely, with security, upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our
conscience, with regard to what we ought and ought not to do.” But Dr.
Reid is surely unfortunate in illustrating the power of conscience by
the analogy of the external senses. With regard to the intimations
received through the organs of sense, there can be no difference of
opinion, and there can be no room for argument. They give us at once
correct information, which reasoning can neither invalidate nor confirm.
But it is surely impossible to say as much for the power of conscience,
which sometimes gives the most opposite intimations with regard to the
simplest moral facts, and which requires to be corrected by an accurate
attention to the established order of nature, or to the known will of
God, before we can rely with confidence on its decisions. It does not
appear, that conscience can with propriety be considered as a principle
distinct from that which enables us to pronounce on the general merit or
demerit of moral actions. This principle, or faculty, is attended with
peculiar feelings, when we ourselves are the agents; we are then too
deeply interested to view the matter as a mere subject of reasoning; and
pleasure or pain are excited, with a degree of intensity proportioned to
the importance which we always assign to our own interests and feelings.
In the case of others, our approbation or disapprobation is generally
qualified, sometimes suspended, by our ignorance of the motives by which
they have been influenced; but, in our own case, the motives and the
actions are both before us, and when they do not correspond, we feel the
same disgust with ourselves that we should feel toward another, whose
motives we knew to be vicious, while his actions are specious and
plausible. But in our own case, the uneasy feeling is heightened in a
tenfold degree, because self-contempt and disgust are brought into
competition with the warmest self-love, and the strongest desire of
self-approbation. We have then something of the feelings of a parent,
who knows the worthlessness of the child he loves, and contemplates with
horror the shame and infamy which might arise from exposure to the
world.
2. Conscience, then, cannot be considered as any thing else than the
general principle of moral approbation or disapprobation applied to our
own feelings or conduct, acting with increased energy from the knowledge
which we have of our motives and actions, and from the deep interest
which we take in whatever concerns ourselves; nor can we think that they
have deserved well of morals or philosophy, who have attempted to deduce
our notions of right and wrong from any one principle. Various powers
both of the understanding and of the will are concerned in every moral
conclusion; and conscience derives its chief and most salutary influence
from the consideration of our being continually in the presence of God,
and accountable to him for all our thoughts, words, and actions. A
conscience well informed, and possessed of sensibility, is the best
security for virtue, and the most awful avenger of wicked deeds; an
ill-informed conscience is the most powerful instrument of mischief; a
squeamish and ticklish conscience generally renders those who are under
its influence ridiculous.
_Hic murus aheneus esto,
Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa._
[Let a consciousness of innocence, and a fearlessness of any accusation,
be thy brazen bulwark.]
3. The rule of conscience is the will of God, so far as it is made known
to us, either by the light of nature, or by that of revelation. With
respect to the knowledge of this rule, conscience is said to be rightly
informed, or mistaken; firm, or wavering, or scrupulous, &c. With
respect to the conformity of our actions to this rule when known,
conscience is said to be good or evil. In a moral view, it is of the
greatest importance that the understanding be well informed, in order to
render the judgment or verdict of conscience a safe directory of
conduct, and a proper source of satisfaction. Otherwise, the judgment of
conscience may be pleaded, and it has actually been pleaded, as an
apology for very unwarrantable conduct. Many atrocious acts of
persecution have been perpetrated, and afterward justified, under the
sanction of an erroneous conscience. It is also of no small importance,
that the sensibility of conscience be duly maintained and cherished; for
want of which men have often been betrayed into criminal conduct without
self-reproach, and have deluded themselves with false notions of their
character and state. See MORAL OBLIGATION.