As the ancient Hebrews paid a stipulated price for the
privilege of marrying, they seemed to consider it the natural
consequence of making a payment of that kind, that they should be at
liberty to exercise a very arbitrary power over their wives, and to
renounce or divorce them whenever they chose. This state of things, as
Moses himself very clearly saw, was not equitable as respected the
woman, and was very often injurious to both parties. Finding himself,
however, unable to overrule feelings and practices of very ancient
standing, he merely annexed to the original institution of marriage a
very serious admonition to this effect, viz. that it would be less
criminal for a man to desert his father and mother, than without
adequate cause to desert his wife, Gen. ii, 14, compared with Malachi
ii, 11–16. He also laid a restriction upon the power of the husband as
far as this, that he would not permit him to repudiate the wife without
giving her a bill of divorce. He farther enacted in reference to this
subject that the husband might receive the repudiated wife back, in case
she had not in the meanwhile been married to another person; but if she
had been thus married, she could never afterward become the wife of her
first husband; a law, which the faith due to the second husband clearly
required, Deut. xxiv, 1–4, compare Jer. iii, 1, and Matt. i, 19; xix, 8.
The inquiry, “What should be considered an adequate cause of divorce,”
was left by Moses to be determined by the husband himself. He had
liberty to divorce her, if he saw in her _any thing naked_, any thing
displeasing or improper, any thing so much at war with propriety, and a
source of so much dissatisfaction as to be, in the estimation of the
husband, sufficient ground for separation. These expressions, however,
were sharply contested as to their meaning in the later times of the
Jewish nation. The school of Hillel contended, that the husband might
lawfully put away the wife for any cause, even the smallest. The mistake
committed by the school of Hillel in taking this ground was, that they
confounded moral and civil law. It is true, as far as the Mosaic statute
or the civil law was concerned, the husband had a right thus to do; but
it is equally clear, that the ground of just separation must have been,
not a _trivial_, but a prominent and important one, when it is
considered, that he was bound to consult the rights of the woman, and
was amenable to his conscience and his God. The school of Shammai
explained the phrase, _nakedness of a thing_, to mean _actual adultery_.
Our Lord agreed with the school of Shammai as far as this, that the
ground of divorce should be one of a moral nature, and not less than
adultery; but he does not appear to have agreed with them in their
opinion in respect to the Mosaic statute. On the contrary, he denied the
equity of that statute, and in justification of Moses maintained, that
he permitted divorces for causes below adultery, only in consequence of
the hardness of the people’s hearts, Matt. v, 31, 32; xviii, 1–9; Mark
x, 2–12; Luke xvi, 18. Wives, who were considered the property of their
husbands, did not enjoy by the Mosaic statutes a reciprocal right, and
were not at liberty to dissolve the matrimonial alliance by giving a
bill of divorce to that effect. In the latter periods, however, of the
Jewish state, the Jewish matrons, the more powerful of them at least,
appear to have imbibed the spirit of the ladies of Rome, and to have
exercised in their own behalf the same power that was granted by the
Mosaic law only to their husbands, Mark vi, 17–29; x, 12.
DOCETÆ, the advocates of an early heresy, which taught that Christ acted
and suffered, not in reality, but in appearance. They were so
denominated from δοκεῖν, _to appear_. See GNOSTICS.
privilege of marrying, they seemed to consider it the natural
consequence of making a payment of that kind, that they should be at
liberty to exercise a very arbitrary power over their wives, and to
renounce or divorce them whenever they chose. This state of things, as
Moses himself very clearly saw, was not equitable as respected the
woman, and was very often injurious to both parties. Finding himself,
however, unable to overrule feelings and practices of very ancient
standing, he merely annexed to the original institution of marriage a
very serious admonition to this effect, viz. that it would be less
criminal for a man to desert his father and mother, than without
adequate cause to desert his wife, Gen. ii, 14, compared with Malachi
ii, 11–16. He also laid a restriction upon the power of the husband as
far as this, that he would not permit him to repudiate the wife without
giving her a bill of divorce. He farther enacted in reference to this
subject that the husband might receive the repudiated wife back, in case
she had not in the meanwhile been married to another person; but if she
had been thus married, she could never afterward become the wife of her
first husband; a law, which the faith due to the second husband clearly
required, Deut. xxiv, 1–4, compare Jer. iii, 1, and Matt. i, 19; xix, 8.
The inquiry, “What should be considered an adequate cause of divorce,”
was left by Moses to be determined by the husband himself. He had
liberty to divorce her, if he saw in her _any thing naked_, any thing
displeasing or improper, any thing so much at war with propriety, and a
source of so much dissatisfaction as to be, in the estimation of the
husband, sufficient ground for separation. These expressions, however,
were sharply contested as to their meaning in the later times of the
Jewish nation. The school of Hillel contended, that the husband might
lawfully put away the wife for any cause, even the smallest. The mistake
committed by the school of Hillel in taking this ground was, that they
confounded moral and civil law. It is true, as far as the Mosaic statute
or the civil law was concerned, the husband had a right thus to do; but
it is equally clear, that the ground of just separation must have been,
not a _trivial_, but a prominent and important one, when it is
considered, that he was bound to consult the rights of the woman, and
was amenable to his conscience and his God. The school of Shammai
explained the phrase, _nakedness of a thing_, to mean _actual adultery_.
Our Lord agreed with the school of Shammai as far as this, that the
ground of divorce should be one of a moral nature, and not less than
adultery; but he does not appear to have agreed with them in their
opinion in respect to the Mosaic statute. On the contrary, he denied the
equity of that statute, and in justification of Moses maintained, that
he permitted divorces for causes below adultery, only in consequence of
the hardness of the people’s hearts, Matt. v, 31, 32; xviii, 1–9; Mark
x, 2–12; Luke xvi, 18. Wives, who were considered the property of their
husbands, did not enjoy by the Mosaic statutes a reciprocal right, and
were not at liberty to dissolve the matrimonial alliance by giving a
bill of divorce to that effect. In the latter periods, however, of the
Jewish state, the Jewish matrons, the more powerful of them at least,
appear to have imbibed the spirit of the ladies of Rome, and to have
exercised in their own behalf the same power that was granted by the
Mosaic law only to their husbands, Mark vi, 17–29; x, 12.
DOCETÆ, the advocates of an early heresy, which taught that Christ acted
and suffered, not in reality, but in appearance. They were so
denominated from δοκεῖν, _to appear_. See GNOSTICS.