the first woman. She was called הוה, Gen. iii, 20, a word that
signifies _life_, because she was to be the mother of all that live. Our
translators, therefore, might have called her _Life_, as the Septuagint,
who render the Hebrew word by Ζωὴ. Soon after the expulsion of the first
pair from paradise, Eve conceived and bare a son; and imagining, as is
probable, that she had given birth to the promised seed, she called his
name Cain, which signifies _possession_, saying, “I have gotten a man
from the Lord.” She afterward had Abel, and some daughters, and then
Seth. The Scriptures name only these three sons of Adam and Eve, but
sufficiently inform us, Gen. v, 4, that they had many more, saying, that
“Adam lived, after he had begotten Seth, eight hundred years, and begat
sons and daughters.” See ADAM.
EVIL is distinguished into natural and moral. Natural evil is whatever
destroys or any way disturbs the perfection of natural beings, such as
blindness, diseases, death, &c. Moral evil is the disagreement between
the actions of a moral agent, and the rule of those actions, whatever it
be. Applied to choice, or acting contrary to the moral or revealed laws
of the Deity, it is termed _wickedness_, or _sin_. Applied to an act
contrary to a mere rule of fitness, it is called a _fault_. The question
concerning the origin of evil has very much perplexed philosophers and
divines, both ancient and modern. Plato, for the solution of this
question, maintained, that matter, from its nature, possesses a blind
and refractory force, from which arises in it a propensity to disorder
and deformity; and that this is the cause of all the imperfection which
appears in the works of God, and the origin of evil. Matter, he
conceives, resists the will of the supreme Artificer, so that he cannot
possibly execute his designs; and this is the cause of the mixture of
good and evil, which is found in the material world. “It cannot be,”
says he, “that evil should be destroyed, for there must always be
something contrary to good;” and again, “God wills, as far as it is
possible, every thing good, and nothing evil.” What that property of
matter is which opposes the wise and benevolent intentions of the first
Intelligence, Plato has not clearly explained; but he speaks of it as
ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, an innate propensity to disorder, and says, that
before nature was adorned with its present beautiful forms, it was
inclined to confusion and deformity, and that from this habitude arises
all the evil which happens in the world. Plutarch supposes the Platonic
notion to be, that there is in matter an unconscious, irrational soul;
and this supposition has been adopted by several modern writers. But the
writings of Plato afford no evidence that he conceived the imperfection
of matter to arise from any cause distinct from its nature. Such a
notion is incongruous with Plato’s general system, and is contrary to
the doctrine of the Pythagorean school, to which he was probably
indebted for his notions on this subject; for the philosophers of that
sect held that motion is the effect of a power essential to matter. Some
of the Stoics adopted the notion of the Platonists concerning the origin
of evil, and ascribed it to the defective nature of matter, which it is
not in the power of the great Artificer to change; asserting, that
imperfections appear in the world, not through any defect of skill in
its author, but because matter will not admit of the accomplishment of
his designs. But it was perceived by others, that this hypothesis was
inconsistent with the fundamental doctrine of the Stoics concerning
nature. For since, according to their system, matter itself receives all
its qualities from God, if its defects be the cause of evil, these
defects must be ultimately ascribed to him. No other way of relieving
this difficulty remained, than to have recourse to fate, and say, that
evil was the necessary consequence of that eternal necessity to which
the great whole, comprehending both God and matter, is subject. Thus,
when Chrysippus was asked whether diseases were to be ascribed to Divine
providence, he replied that it was not the intention of nature that
these things should happen; nor were they conformable to the will of the
Author of nature and Parent of all good things; but that, in framing the
world, some inconveniences had adhered by necessary consequence, to his
wise and useful plan. To others the question concerning the origin of
evil appeared so intricate and difficult, that, finding themselves
unequal to the solution of it, they denied either that there is any God
at all, or, at least, any author or governor of the world. The
Epicureans belonged to this class; nor does Lucretius allege any other
reason for denying the system of the world to be the production of a
Deity beside its being so very faulty. Others again judged it to be more
rational to assign a double cause of visible effects, than to assign no
cause at all; as nothing, indeed, can be more absurd than to admit
actions and effects without any agent and cause. These persons
perceiving a mixture of good and evil, and being persuaded that so many
inconsistencies and disorders could not proceed from a good being,
supposed the existence of a malevolent principle, or god, directly
contrary to the good one; hence they derived corruption and death,
diseases, griefs, mischiefs, frauds, and villanies, while from the good
being they deduced nothing but good. This opinion was held by many of
the ancients; by the Persian magi, Manicheans, Paulicians, &c.
2. Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his “Demonstration of the Being and Attributes
of God,” deduces from the possibility and real existence of human
liberty an answer to the question, What is the cause and original of
evil? For liberty, he says, implying a natural power of doing evil, as
well as good; and the imperfect nature of finite beings making it
possible for them to abuse this their liberty to an actual commission of
evil; and it being necessary to the order and beauty of the whole, and
for displaying the infinite wisdom of the Creator, that there should be
different and various degrees of creatures, whereof, consequently, some
must be less perfect than others; hence there necessarily arises a
possibility of evil, notwithstanding that the Creator is infinitely
good. In short thus: all that we call evil is either an evil of
imperfection, as the want of certain faculties and excellencies which
other creatures have; or natural evil, as pain, death, and the like; or
moral evil, as all kinds of vice. The first of these is not properly an
evil: for every power, faculty, or perfection, which any creature
enjoys, being the free gift of God, which he was no more obliged to
bestow, than he was to confer being or existence itself, it is plain the
want of any certain faculty or perfection in any kind of creatures which
never belonged to their nature, is no more an evil to them than their
never having been created, or brought into being at all, could properly
have been called an evil. The second kind of evil, which we call natural
evil, is either a necessary consequence of the former; as death, to a
creature on whose nature immortality was never conferred; and then it is
no more properly an evil than the former; or else it is counterpoised,
in the whole, with as great or greater good, as the afflictions and
sufferings of good men, and then also it is not properly an evil; or
else, lastly, it is a punishment; and then it is a necessary consequent
of the third and last sort of evil, namely, moral evil. And this arises
wholly from the abuse of liberty, which God gave to his creatures for
other purposes, and which it was reasonable and fit to give them for the
perfection and order of the whole creation; only they, contrary to God’s
intention and command, have abused what was necessary for the perfection
of the whole, to the corruption and depravation of themselves. And thus
all sorts of evils have entered into the world, without any diminution
to the infinite goodness of its Creator and Governor.
3. This is obviously all the answer which the question respecting the
origin of evil is capable of receiving. It brings us to the point to
which the Scriptures themselves lead us. And though many questions may
yet be asked, respecting a subject so mysterious as the permission of
evil by the Supreme Being, this is a part of his _counsels_ of which we
can have no cognizance, unless he is pleased to reveal them; and as
revelation is silent upon this subject, except generally, that all his
acts, his permissive ones as well as others, are “wise, and just, and
good,” we may rest assured, that beyond what is revealed, human wisdom
in the present state can never penetrate.
signifies _life_, because she was to be the mother of all that live. Our
translators, therefore, might have called her _Life_, as the Septuagint,
who render the Hebrew word by Ζωὴ. Soon after the expulsion of the first
pair from paradise, Eve conceived and bare a son; and imagining, as is
probable, that she had given birth to the promised seed, she called his
name Cain, which signifies _possession_, saying, “I have gotten a man
from the Lord.” She afterward had Abel, and some daughters, and then
Seth. The Scriptures name only these three sons of Adam and Eve, but
sufficiently inform us, Gen. v, 4, that they had many more, saying, that
“Adam lived, after he had begotten Seth, eight hundred years, and begat
sons and daughters.” See ADAM.
EVIL is distinguished into natural and moral. Natural evil is whatever
destroys or any way disturbs the perfection of natural beings, such as
blindness, diseases, death, &c. Moral evil is the disagreement between
the actions of a moral agent, and the rule of those actions, whatever it
be. Applied to choice, or acting contrary to the moral or revealed laws
of the Deity, it is termed _wickedness_, or _sin_. Applied to an act
contrary to a mere rule of fitness, it is called a _fault_. The question
concerning the origin of evil has very much perplexed philosophers and
divines, both ancient and modern. Plato, for the solution of this
question, maintained, that matter, from its nature, possesses a blind
and refractory force, from which arises in it a propensity to disorder
and deformity; and that this is the cause of all the imperfection which
appears in the works of God, and the origin of evil. Matter, he
conceives, resists the will of the supreme Artificer, so that he cannot
possibly execute his designs; and this is the cause of the mixture of
good and evil, which is found in the material world. “It cannot be,”
says he, “that evil should be destroyed, for there must always be
something contrary to good;” and again, “God wills, as far as it is
possible, every thing good, and nothing evil.” What that property of
matter is which opposes the wise and benevolent intentions of the first
Intelligence, Plato has not clearly explained; but he speaks of it as
ξύμφυτος ἐπιθυμία, an innate propensity to disorder, and says, that
before nature was adorned with its present beautiful forms, it was
inclined to confusion and deformity, and that from this habitude arises
all the evil which happens in the world. Plutarch supposes the Platonic
notion to be, that there is in matter an unconscious, irrational soul;
and this supposition has been adopted by several modern writers. But the
writings of Plato afford no evidence that he conceived the imperfection
of matter to arise from any cause distinct from its nature. Such a
notion is incongruous with Plato’s general system, and is contrary to
the doctrine of the Pythagorean school, to which he was probably
indebted for his notions on this subject; for the philosophers of that
sect held that motion is the effect of a power essential to matter. Some
of the Stoics adopted the notion of the Platonists concerning the origin
of evil, and ascribed it to the defective nature of matter, which it is
not in the power of the great Artificer to change; asserting, that
imperfections appear in the world, not through any defect of skill in
its author, but because matter will not admit of the accomplishment of
his designs. But it was perceived by others, that this hypothesis was
inconsistent with the fundamental doctrine of the Stoics concerning
nature. For since, according to their system, matter itself receives all
its qualities from God, if its defects be the cause of evil, these
defects must be ultimately ascribed to him. No other way of relieving
this difficulty remained, than to have recourse to fate, and say, that
evil was the necessary consequence of that eternal necessity to which
the great whole, comprehending both God and matter, is subject. Thus,
when Chrysippus was asked whether diseases were to be ascribed to Divine
providence, he replied that it was not the intention of nature that
these things should happen; nor were they conformable to the will of the
Author of nature and Parent of all good things; but that, in framing the
world, some inconveniences had adhered by necessary consequence, to his
wise and useful plan. To others the question concerning the origin of
evil appeared so intricate and difficult, that, finding themselves
unequal to the solution of it, they denied either that there is any God
at all, or, at least, any author or governor of the world. The
Epicureans belonged to this class; nor does Lucretius allege any other
reason for denying the system of the world to be the production of a
Deity beside its being so very faulty. Others again judged it to be more
rational to assign a double cause of visible effects, than to assign no
cause at all; as nothing, indeed, can be more absurd than to admit
actions and effects without any agent and cause. These persons
perceiving a mixture of good and evil, and being persuaded that so many
inconsistencies and disorders could not proceed from a good being,
supposed the existence of a malevolent principle, or god, directly
contrary to the good one; hence they derived corruption and death,
diseases, griefs, mischiefs, frauds, and villanies, while from the good
being they deduced nothing but good. This opinion was held by many of
the ancients; by the Persian magi, Manicheans, Paulicians, &c.
2. Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his “Demonstration of the Being and Attributes
of God,” deduces from the possibility and real existence of human
liberty an answer to the question, What is the cause and original of
evil? For liberty, he says, implying a natural power of doing evil, as
well as good; and the imperfect nature of finite beings making it
possible for them to abuse this their liberty to an actual commission of
evil; and it being necessary to the order and beauty of the whole, and
for displaying the infinite wisdom of the Creator, that there should be
different and various degrees of creatures, whereof, consequently, some
must be less perfect than others; hence there necessarily arises a
possibility of evil, notwithstanding that the Creator is infinitely
good. In short thus: all that we call evil is either an evil of
imperfection, as the want of certain faculties and excellencies which
other creatures have; or natural evil, as pain, death, and the like; or
moral evil, as all kinds of vice. The first of these is not properly an
evil: for every power, faculty, or perfection, which any creature
enjoys, being the free gift of God, which he was no more obliged to
bestow, than he was to confer being or existence itself, it is plain the
want of any certain faculty or perfection in any kind of creatures which
never belonged to their nature, is no more an evil to them than their
never having been created, or brought into being at all, could properly
have been called an evil. The second kind of evil, which we call natural
evil, is either a necessary consequence of the former; as death, to a
creature on whose nature immortality was never conferred; and then it is
no more properly an evil than the former; or else it is counterpoised,
in the whole, with as great or greater good, as the afflictions and
sufferings of good men, and then also it is not properly an evil; or
else, lastly, it is a punishment; and then it is a necessary consequent
of the third and last sort of evil, namely, moral evil. And this arises
wholly from the abuse of liberty, which God gave to his creatures for
other purposes, and which it was reasonable and fit to give them for the
perfection and order of the whole creation; only they, contrary to God’s
intention and command, have abused what was necessary for the perfection
of the whole, to the corruption and depravation of themselves. And thus
all sorts of evils have entered into the world, without any diminution
to the infinite goodness of its Creator and Governor.
3. This is obviously all the answer which the question respecting the
origin of evil is capable of receiving. It brings us to the point to
which the Scriptures themselves lead us. And though many questions may
yet be asked, respecting a subject so mysterious as the permission of
evil by the Supreme Being, this is a part of his _counsels_ of which we
can have no cognizance, unless he is pleased to reveal them; and as
revelation is silent upon this subject, except generally, that all his
acts, his permissive ones as well as others, are “wise, and just, and
good,” we may rest assured, that beyond what is revealed, human wisdom
in the present state can never penetrate.