Different opinions have been held as to the ground of
moral obligation. Grotius, Balguy, and Dr. Samuel Clarke, place it in
the eternal and necessary fitness of things. To this there are two
objections. The first is, that it leaves the distinction between virtue
and vice, in a great measure, arbitrary and indefinite, dependent upon
our perception of fitness and unfitness, which, in different individuals
will greatly differ. The second is, that when a fitness or unfitness is
proved, it is no more than the discovery of a natural essential
difference or congruity, which alone cannot constitute a moral
obligation to choose what is fit, and to reject what is unfit. When we
have proved a fitness in a certain course of action, we have not proved
that it is obligatory. A second step is necessary before we can reach
this conclusion. Cudworth, Butler, Price, and others, maintain, that
virtue carries its own obligation in itself; that the understanding at
once perceives a certain action to be right, and therefore it ought to
be performed. Several objections lie to this notion: 1. It supposes the
understandings of men to determine precisely in the same manner
concerning all virtuous and vicious actions; which is contrary to fact.
2. It supposes a previous rule, by which the action is determined to be
right; but if the revealed will of God is not to be taken into
consideration, what common rule exists among men? There is evidently no
such rule, and therefore no means of certainly determining what is
right. 3. If a common standard were known among men, and if the
understandings of men determined in the same manner as to the
conformity, or otherwise, of an action to that standard; what renders it
a matter of obligation that any one should perform it? The rule must be
proved to be binding, or no ground of obligation is established.
An action is obligatory, say others, because it is agreeable to the
moral sense. This is the theory of Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Hutcheson.
By moral sense appears to be meant an instinctive approbation of right,
and abhorrence of wrong, prior to all reflection on their nature, or
their consequences. If any thing else were understood by it, then the
moral sense must be the same with conscience, which we know to vary with
the judgment, and cannot therefore be the basis of moral obligation. If
conscience be not meant, then the moral sense must be considered as
instinctive: a notion, certainly, which is disproved by the whole moral
history of man. It may, indeed, be conceded, that such is the
constitution of the human soul, that when those distinctions between
actions, which have been taught by religious tradition or direct
revelation, are known in their nature, relations, and consequences, the
calm and sober judgments of men will approve of them; and that
especially when they are considered abstractedly, that is, as not
affecting and controlling their own interests and passions immediately,
virtue may command complacency, and vice provoke abhorrence: but that,
independent of reflection on their nature or their consequences, there
is an instinctive principle in man which abhors evil, and loves good, is
contradicted by that variety of opinion and feeling on the vices and
virtues, which obtains among all uninstructed nations. We applaud the
forgiveness of an injury as magnanimous; a savage despises it as mean.
We think it a duty to support and cherish aged parents; many nations, on
the contrary, abandon them as useless, and throw them to the beasts of
the field. Innumerable instances of this contrariety might be adduced,
which are all contrary to the notion of instinctive sentiment. Instincts
operate uniformly, but this assumed moral sense does not. Beside, if it
be mere matter of feeling, independent of judgment, to love virtue, and
abhor vice, the morality of the exercise of this principle is
questionable; for it would be difficult to show, that there is any more
morality, properly speaking, in the affections and disgusts of instinct
than in those of the palate. If judgment, the knowledge and comparison
of things, be included, then this principle supposes a uniform and
universal individual revelation as to the nature of things to every man,
or an intuitive faculty of determining their moral quality; both of
which are too absurd to be maintained.
The only satisfactory conclusion on this subject, is that which refers
moral obligation to the will of God. Obligation,” says Warburton,
necessarily implies an obliger, and the obliger must be different from,
and not one and the same with, the obliged. Moral obligation, that is,
the obligation of a free agent, farther implies a law, which enjoins and
forbids; but a law is the imposition of an intelligent superior, who
hath power to exact conformity thereto.” This lawgiver is God; and
whatever may be the reasons which have led him to enjoin this, and to
prohibit that, it is plain that the obligation to obey lies not merely
in the fitness and propriety of a creature obeying an infinitely wise
and good Creator, (though such a fitness exists,) but in that obedience
being enjoined. For, since the question respects the duty of a created
being with reference to his Creator, nothing can be more conclusive than
that the Creator has an absolute right to the obedience of his
creatures; and that the creature is in duty obliged to obey him from
whom it not only has received being, but by whom that being is
constantly sustained. It has, indeed, been said, that even if it be
admitted, that I am obliged to obey the will of God, the question is
still open, Why am I obliged to obey his will?” and that this brings us
round to the former answer; because he can only will what is upon the
whole best for his creatures. But this is confounding that which may be,
and doubtless is, a rule to God in the commands which he issues, with
that which really obliges the creature. Now, that which in truth obliges
the creature is not the nature of the commands issued by God; but the
relation in which the creature itself stands to God. If a creature can
have no existence, nor any power or faculty independently of God, it can
have no right to employ its faculties independently of him; and if it
have no right to employ its faculties in an independent manner, the
right to rule its conduct must rest with the Creater alone; and from
this results the obligation of absolute and universal obedience.
moral obligation. Grotius, Balguy, and Dr. Samuel Clarke, place it in
the eternal and necessary fitness of things. To this there are two
objections. The first is, that it leaves the distinction between virtue
and vice, in a great measure, arbitrary and indefinite, dependent upon
our perception of fitness and unfitness, which, in different individuals
will greatly differ. The second is, that when a fitness or unfitness is
proved, it is no more than the discovery of a natural essential
difference or congruity, which alone cannot constitute a moral
obligation to choose what is fit, and to reject what is unfit. When we
have proved a fitness in a certain course of action, we have not proved
that it is obligatory. A second step is necessary before we can reach
this conclusion. Cudworth, Butler, Price, and others, maintain, that
virtue carries its own obligation in itself; that the understanding at
once perceives a certain action to be right, and therefore it ought to
be performed. Several objections lie to this notion: 1. It supposes the
understandings of men to determine precisely in the same manner
concerning all virtuous and vicious actions; which is contrary to fact.
2. It supposes a previous rule, by which the action is determined to be
right; but if the revealed will of God is not to be taken into
consideration, what common rule exists among men? There is evidently no
such rule, and therefore no means of certainly determining what is
right. 3. If a common standard were known among men, and if the
understandings of men determined in the same manner as to the
conformity, or otherwise, of an action to that standard; what renders it
a matter of obligation that any one should perform it? The rule must be
proved to be binding, or no ground of obligation is established.
An action is obligatory, say others, because it is agreeable to the
moral sense. This is the theory of Lord Shaftesbury and Dr. Hutcheson.
By moral sense appears to be meant an instinctive approbation of right,
and abhorrence of wrong, prior to all reflection on their nature, or
their consequences. If any thing else were understood by it, then the
moral sense must be the same with conscience, which we know to vary with
the judgment, and cannot therefore be the basis of moral obligation. If
conscience be not meant, then the moral sense must be considered as
instinctive: a notion, certainly, which is disproved by the whole moral
history of man. It may, indeed, be conceded, that such is the
constitution of the human soul, that when those distinctions between
actions, which have been taught by religious tradition or direct
revelation, are known in their nature, relations, and consequences, the
calm and sober judgments of men will approve of them; and that
especially when they are considered abstractedly, that is, as not
affecting and controlling their own interests and passions immediately,
virtue may command complacency, and vice provoke abhorrence: but that,
independent of reflection on their nature or their consequences, there
is an instinctive principle in man which abhors evil, and loves good, is
contradicted by that variety of opinion and feeling on the vices and
virtues, which obtains among all uninstructed nations. We applaud the
forgiveness of an injury as magnanimous; a savage despises it as mean.
We think it a duty to support and cherish aged parents; many nations, on
the contrary, abandon them as useless, and throw them to the beasts of
the field. Innumerable instances of this contrariety might be adduced,
which are all contrary to the notion of instinctive sentiment. Instincts
operate uniformly, but this assumed moral sense does not. Beside, if it
be mere matter of feeling, independent of judgment, to love virtue, and
abhor vice, the morality of the exercise of this principle is
questionable; for it would be difficult to show, that there is any more
morality, properly speaking, in the affections and disgusts of instinct
than in those of the palate. If judgment, the knowledge and comparison
of things, be included, then this principle supposes a uniform and
universal individual revelation as to the nature of things to every man,
or an intuitive faculty of determining their moral quality; both of
which are too absurd to be maintained.
The only satisfactory conclusion on this subject, is that which refers
moral obligation to the will of God. Obligation,” says Warburton,
necessarily implies an obliger, and the obliger must be different from,
and not one and the same with, the obliged. Moral obligation, that is,
the obligation of a free agent, farther implies a law, which enjoins and
forbids; but a law is the imposition of an intelligent superior, who
hath power to exact conformity thereto.” This lawgiver is God; and
whatever may be the reasons which have led him to enjoin this, and to
prohibit that, it is plain that the obligation to obey lies not merely
in the fitness and propriety of a creature obeying an infinitely wise
and good Creator, (though such a fitness exists,) but in that obedience
being enjoined. For, since the question respects the duty of a created
being with reference to his Creator, nothing can be more conclusive than
that the Creator has an absolute right to the obedience of his
creatures; and that the creature is in duty obliged to obey him from
whom it not only has received being, but by whom that being is
constantly sustained. It has, indeed, been said, that even if it be
admitted, that I am obliged to obey the will of God, the question is
still open, Why am I obliged to obey his will?” and that this brings us
round to the former answer; because he can only will what is upon the
whole best for his creatures. But this is confounding that which may be,
and doubtless is, a rule to God in the commands which he issues, with
that which really obliges the creature. Now, that which in truth obliges
the creature is not the nature of the commands issued by God; but the
relation in which the creature itself stands to God. If a creature can
have no existence, nor any power or faculty independently of God, it can
have no right to employ its faculties independently of him; and if it
have no right to employ its faculties in an independent manner, the
right to rule its conduct must rest with the Creater alone; and from
this results the obligation of absolute and universal obedience.