The doctrine of necessity regards the origin of human
actions, and the specific mode of the divine government; and it seems to
be the immediate result of the materiality of man; for mechanism is the
undoubted consequence of materialism. Hence all materialists are of
course necessitarians; but it does not follow that all necessitarians
are or must be materialists. Whatever is done by a cause or power that
is irresistible, is by necessity; in which sense this term is opposed to
freedom. Man is, therefore, a necessary agent, if all his actions be so
determined by the causes preceding each action, that not one past action
could possibly not have come to pass, or have been otherwise than it
hath been; and not one future action can possibly not come to pass, or
be otherwise than it shall be. But man is a free agent, if he be able at
any time, in the circumstances in which he is placed, to do different
things; or, in other words, if he be not unavoidably determined in every
point of time by the circumstances he is in, and the causes he is under,
to do that one thing he does, and not possibly to do any other thing.
This abstruse subject has occasioned much controversy, and has been
debated by writers of the first eminence, from Hobbes and Clarke, to
Priestley and Gregory. The anti-necessitarians allege, that the doctrine
of necessity charges God as the author of sin; that it takes away the
freedom of the will; renders man unaccountable to his Maker; makes sin
to be no evil, and morality or virtue to be no good; and that it
precludes the use of means, and is of the most gloomy tendency. The
necessitarians, on the other hand, deny these to be legitimate
consequences of their doctrine, which they declare to be the most
consistent mode of explaining the divine government; and they observe,
that the Deity acts no more immorally in decreeing vicious actions, than
in permitting all those irregularities which he could so easily have
prevented. All necessity, say they, doth not take away freedom. The
actions of a man may be at one and the same time both free and
necessary. Thus, it was infallibly certain that Judas would betray
Christ, yet he did it voluntarily; Jesus Christ necessarily became man,
and died, yet he acted freely. A good man doth naturally and necessarily
love his children, yet voluntarily. They insist that necessity doth not
render actions less morally good; for, if necessary virtue be neither
moral nor praiseworthy, it will follow that God himself is not a moral
being, because he is a necessary one; and the obedience of Christ cannot
be good, because it was necessary. Farther, say they, necessity does not
preclude the use of means; for means are no less appointed than the end.
It was ordained that Christ should be delivered up to death; but he
could not have been betrayed without a betrayer, nor crucified without
crucifiers. That it is not a gloomy doctrine they allege, because
nothing can be more consolatory than to believe, that all things are
under the direction of an all-wise Being, that his kingdom ruleth over
all, and that he doeth all things well. They also urge, that to deny
necessity, is to deny the foreknowledge of God, and to wrest the sceptre
from the hand of the Creator, and to place that capricious and
undefinable principle, the self-determining power of man, upon the
throne of the universe. In these statements there is obviously a
confused use of terms in different meanings, so as to mislead the
unwary. For instance: _necessity_ is confounded with _certainty_; but an
action may be certain, though free; that is to say, certain to an
omniscient Being, who knows how a free agent will finally resolve; but
this certainty is, in fact, a quality of the prescient Being, not that
of the action, to which, however, men delusively transfer it. Again: God
is called a necessary Being, which, if it mean any thing, signifies, as
to his moral acts, that he can only act right. But then this is a wrong
application of the term necessity, which properly implies such a
constraint upon actions, exercised _ab extra_, as renders choice or will
impossible. But such necessity cannot exist as to the supreme Being.
Again: the obedience of Christ unto death was necessary, that is to say,
unless he had died guilty man could not have been forgiven; but this
could not make the act of the Jews who put him to death a necessary act,
that is to say, a forced and constrained one; nor did this necessity
affect the act of Christ himself, who acted voluntarily, and might have
left man without salvation. That the Jews acted _freely_, is evident
from their being held liable to punishment, although unconsciously they
accomplished the great designs of Heaven, which, however, was no excuse
for their crime. Finally: as to the allegation, that the doctrine of
free agency puts man’s self-determining power upon the throne of the
universe, that view proceeds upon notions unworthy of God, as though he
could not accomplish his plans without compelling and controlling all
things by a fixed fate; whereas it is both more glorious to him, and
certainly more in accordance with the Scriptures, to say that he has a
perfect foresight of the manner in which all creatures will act, and
that he, by a profound and infinite wisdom, subordinates every thing
without violence to the evolution and accomplishment of his own glorious
purposes.
The doctrine of necessity is nearly connected with that of
predestination, which, of late years, has assumed a form very different
from that which it formerly possessed; for, instead of being considered
as a point to be determined almost entirely by the sacred writings, it
has, in the hands of a number of able writers, in a great measure
resolved itself into a question of natural religion, under the head of
the philosophical liberty or necessity of the will; or, whether all
human actions are, or are not, necessarily determined by motives arising
from the character which God has impressed on our minds, and the train
of circumstances amidst which his providence has placed us? The
Calvinistic doctrine of predestination is, that God for his own glory,
hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.” The scheme of philosophical
necessity, as stated by the most celebrated necessitarian of the age,
is, that every thing is predetermined by the divine Being; that whatever
has been, must have been; and that whatever will be, must be; that all
events are preordained by infinite wisdom and unlimited goodness; that
the will, in all its determinations, is governed by the state of mind;
that the state of mind is, in every instance, determined by the Deity;
and that there is a continued chain of causes and effects, of motives
and actions, inseparably connected, and originating from the condition
in which we are brought into existence by the Author of our being.” On
the other hand, it is justly remarked, that “those who believe the being
and perfections of God, and a state of retribution, in which he will
reward and punish mankind according to the diversity of their actions,
will find it difficult to reconcile the justice of punishment with the
necessity of crimes punished. And they that believe all that the
Scripture says on the one hand, of the eternity of future punishments,
and on the other, of God’s compassion to sinners, and his solemn
assurance that he desires not their death, will find the difficulty
greatly increased.” It is doubtless an article of the Christian faith,
that God will reward or punish every man hereafter according to his
actions in this life. But we cannot maintain his justice in this
particular, if men’s actions be necessary either in their own nature, or
by the divine decrees. Activity and self-determining powers are the
foundation of all morality; and to prove that such powers belong to man,
it is urged that we ourselves are conscious of possessing them. We blame
and condemn ourselves when we do amiss; but guilt, and inward sense of
shame, and remorse of conscience, are feelings which are inconsistent
with the scheme of necessity. It is also agreed that some actions
deserve praise, and afford an inward satisfaction; but for this, there
would be no foundation, if we were invincibly determined in every
volition: so that approbation and blame are consequent on free actions
only. Nor is the matter at all relieved by bringing in a chain of
circumstances as motives necessarily to determine the will. This comes
to the same result in sound argument, as though there was an immediate
_coäction_ of omnipotent power compelling one kind of volitions only;
which is utterly irreconcilable to all just notions of the nature and
operations of will, and to all accountability. Necessity, in the sense
of irresistible control, and the doctrine of Scripture, cannot coëxist.
actions, and the specific mode of the divine government; and it seems to
be the immediate result of the materiality of man; for mechanism is the
undoubted consequence of materialism. Hence all materialists are of
course necessitarians; but it does not follow that all necessitarians
are or must be materialists. Whatever is done by a cause or power that
is irresistible, is by necessity; in which sense this term is opposed to
freedom. Man is, therefore, a necessary agent, if all his actions be so
determined by the causes preceding each action, that not one past action
could possibly not have come to pass, or have been otherwise than it
hath been; and not one future action can possibly not come to pass, or
be otherwise than it shall be. But man is a free agent, if he be able at
any time, in the circumstances in which he is placed, to do different
things; or, in other words, if he be not unavoidably determined in every
point of time by the circumstances he is in, and the causes he is under,
to do that one thing he does, and not possibly to do any other thing.
This abstruse subject has occasioned much controversy, and has been
debated by writers of the first eminence, from Hobbes and Clarke, to
Priestley and Gregory. The anti-necessitarians allege, that the doctrine
of necessity charges God as the author of sin; that it takes away the
freedom of the will; renders man unaccountable to his Maker; makes sin
to be no evil, and morality or virtue to be no good; and that it
precludes the use of means, and is of the most gloomy tendency. The
necessitarians, on the other hand, deny these to be legitimate
consequences of their doctrine, which they declare to be the most
consistent mode of explaining the divine government; and they observe,
that the Deity acts no more immorally in decreeing vicious actions, than
in permitting all those irregularities which he could so easily have
prevented. All necessity, say they, doth not take away freedom. The
actions of a man may be at one and the same time both free and
necessary. Thus, it was infallibly certain that Judas would betray
Christ, yet he did it voluntarily; Jesus Christ necessarily became man,
and died, yet he acted freely. A good man doth naturally and necessarily
love his children, yet voluntarily. They insist that necessity doth not
render actions less morally good; for, if necessary virtue be neither
moral nor praiseworthy, it will follow that God himself is not a moral
being, because he is a necessary one; and the obedience of Christ cannot
be good, because it was necessary. Farther, say they, necessity does not
preclude the use of means; for means are no less appointed than the end.
It was ordained that Christ should be delivered up to death; but he
could not have been betrayed without a betrayer, nor crucified without
crucifiers. That it is not a gloomy doctrine they allege, because
nothing can be more consolatory than to believe, that all things are
under the direction of an all-wise Being, that his kingdom ruleth over
all, and that he doeth all things well. They also urge, that to deny
necessity, is to deny the foreknowledge of God, and to wrest the sceptre
from the hand of the Creator, and to place that capricious and
undefinable principle, the self-determining power of man, upon the
throne of the universe. In these statements there is obviously a
confused use of terms in different meanings, so as to mislead the
unwary. For instance: _necessity_ is confounded with _certainty_; but an
action may be certain, though free; that is to say, certain to an
omniscient Being, who knows how a free agent will finally resolve; but
this certainty is, in fact, a quality of the prescient Being, not that
of the action, to which, however, men delusively transfer it. Again: God
is called a necessary Being, which, if it mean any thing, signifies, as
to his moral acts, that he can only act right. But then this is a wrong
application of the term necessity, which properly implies such a
constraint upon actions, exercised _ab extra_, as renders choice or will
impossible. But such necessity cannot exist as to the supreme Being.
Again: the obedience of Christ unto death was necessary, that is to say,
unless he had died guilty man could not have been forgiven; but this
could not make the act of the Jews who put him to death a necessary act,
that is to say, a forced and constrained one; nor did this necessity
affect the act of Christ himself, who acted voluntarily, and might have
left man without salvation. That the Jews acted _freely_, is evident
from their being held liable to punishment, although unconsciously they
accomplished the great designs of Heaven, which, however, was no excuse
for their crime. Finally: as to the allegation, that the doctrine of
free agency puts man’s self-determining power upon the throne of the
universe, that view proceeds upon notions unworthy of God, as though he
could not accomplish his plans without compelling and controlling all
things by a fixed fate; whereas it is both more glorious to him, and
certainly more in accordance with the Scriptures, to say that he has a
perfect foresight of the manner in which all creatures will act, and
that he, by a profound and infinite wisdom, subordinates every thing
without violence to the evolution and accomplishment of his own glorious
purposes.
The doctrine of necessity is nearly connected with that of
predestination, which, of late years, has assumed a form very different
from that which it formerly possessed; for, instead of being considered
as a point to be determined almost entirely by the sacred writings, it
has, in the hands of a number of able writers, in a great measure
resolved itself into a question of natural religion, under the head of
the philosophical liberty or necessity of the will; or, whether all
human actions are, or are not, necessarily determined by motives arising
from the character which God has impressed on our minds, and the train
of circumstances amidst which his providence has placed us? The
Calvinistic doctrine of predestination is, that God for his own glory,
hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.” The scheme of philosophical
necessity, as stated by the most celebrated necessitarian of the age,
is, that every thing is predetermined by the divine Being; that whatever
has been, must have been; and that whatever will be, must be; that all
events are preordained by infinite wisdom and unlimited goodness; that
the will, in all its determinations, is governed by the state of mind;
that the state of mind is, in every instance, determined by the Deity;
and that there is a continued chain of causes and effects, of motives
and actions, inseparably connected, and originating from the condition
in which we are brought into existence by the Author of our being.” On
the other hand, it is justly remarked, that “those who believe the being
and perfections of God, and a state of retribution, in which he will
reward and punish mankind according to the diversity of their actions,
will find it difficult to reconcile the justice of punishment with the
necessity of crimes punished. And they that believe all that the
Scripture says on the one hand, of the eternity of future punishments,
and on the other, of God’s compassion to sinners, and his solemn
assurance that he desires not their death, will find the difficulty
greatly increased.” It is doubtless an article of the Christian faith,
that God will reward or punish every man hereafter according to his
actions in this life. But we cannot maintain his justice in this
particular, if men’s actions be necessary either in their own nature, or
by the divine decrees. Activity and self-determining powers are the
foundation of all morality; and to prove that such powers belong to man,
it is urged that we ourselves are conscious of possessing them. We blame
and condemn ourselves when we do amiss; but guilt, and inward sense of
shame, and remorse of conscience, are feelings which are inconsistent
with the scheme of necessity. It is also agreed that some actions
deserve praise, and afford an inward satisfaction; but for this, there
would be no foundation, if we were invincibly determined in every
volition: so that approbation and blame are consequent on free actions
only. Nor is the matter at all relieved by bringing in a chain of
circumstances as motives necessarily to determine the will. This comes
to the same result in sound argument, as though there was an immediate
_coäction_ of omnipotent power compelling one kind of volitions only;
which is utterly irreconcilable to all just notions of the nature and
operations of will, and to all accountability. Necessity, in the sense
of irresistible control, and the doctrine of Scripture, cannot coëxist.