or foreknowledge, an attribute of God. (See _Omniscience_.)
On this subject three leading theories have been resorted to, in order
to evade the difficulties which are supposed to be involved in the
opinion commonly received. The Chevalier Ramsay, among his other
speculations, holds it a matter of choice in God, to think of finite
ideas; and similar opinions, though variously worded, have been
occasionally adopted. In substance these opinions are, that though the
knowledge of God be infinite as his power is infinite, there is no more
reason to conclude, that his knowledge should be always exerted to the
full extent of its capacity, than that his power should be employed to
the extent of his omnipotence; and that if we suppose him to _choose_
not to know some contingencies, the infiniteness of his knowledge is not
thereby impugned. To this it may be answered, that the infinite power of
God is in Scripture represented, as in the nature of things it must be,
as an infinite capacity, and not as infinite in act; but that the
knowledge of God is on the contrary never represented there to us as a
capacity to acquire knowledge, but as actually comprehending all things
that are, and all things that can be. 2. That the notion of God’s
choosing to know some things, and not to know others, supposes a reason
why he refuses to know any class of things or events; which reason, it
would seem, can only arise out of their nature and circumstances, and
therefore supposes at least a partial knowledge of them, from which the
reason for his not choosing to know them arises. The doctrine is
therefore somewhat contradictory. But, 3. It is fatal to this opinion
that it does not at all meet the difficulty arising out of the question
of the consistency of divine prescience, and the free actions of men;
since some contingent actions, for which men have been made accountable,
we are sure, have been foreknown by God, because by his Spirit in the
prophets they were foretold; and if the freedom of man can in these
cases be reconciled to the prescience of God, there is no greater
difficulty in any other case which can possibly occur.
A second theory is, that the foreknowledge of contingent events, being
in its own nature impossible, because it implies a contradiction, it
does no dishonour to the divine Being to affirm, that of such events he
has, and can have, no prescience whatever; and thus the prescience of
God, as to moral actions, being wholly denied, the difficulty in
question is got rid of. To this the same answer must be given as to the
former. It does not meet the case, so long as the Scriptures are allowed
to contain prophecies of rewardable and punishable actions. The great
fallacy in the argument, that the certain prescience of a moral action
destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and
certainty are the opposites of each other. It is, perhaps, unfortunate,
that a word which is of figurative etymology, and which consequently can
only have an ideal application to such subjects, should have grown into
common use in this discussion, because it is more liable, on that
account, to present itself to different minds under different shades of
meaning. If, however, the term _contingent_ in this controversy has any
definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must
mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to
necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which results
from the choice of the agent, is distinguished from a necessary one in
this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, according to
the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this
specific quality of a free action, that the term contingency is used; it
might have been otherwise, in other words, it was not necessitated.
Contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom, and is
opposed, not to certainty, but to constraint. The very nature of this
controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question
is not, in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions, that is,
whether they _will_ happen or not; but about the nature of them, whether
free or constrained, whether they _must_ happen or not. Those who
advocate this theory care not about the certainty of actions, simply
considered, that is, whether they will take place or not; the reason why
they object to a certain prescience of moral actions, is this,--they
conclude, that such a prescience renders them necessary. It is the
quality of the action for which they contend, not whether it will happen
or not. If contingency meant _uncertainty_, the sense in which such
theorists take it, the dispute would be at an end. But though an
uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated
action may; for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action, in the
least, to affect its nature. Simple knowledge is, in no sense, a cause
of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with
exerted power: for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or
necessitated as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made a
voluntary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a
necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be
contingent. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on
the same ground. The certainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not
result from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the
necessitating cause; and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action
does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but
from the voluntary cause, that is, the determination of the will. It
alters not the case in the least, to say that the voluntary action might
have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would
have been otherwise; but as the will which gives birth to the action, is
not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of
the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will
nor the act is controlled by the knowledge; and the action, though
foreseen, is still free or contingent. The foreknowledge of God has then
no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for
this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions
may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by
that foreknowledge. But here it is said, If the result of an absolute
contingency be certainly foreknown, it _can_ have no other result, it
_cannot_ happen otherwise.” This is not the true inference. It _will_
not happen otherwise; but it may be asked, Why _can_ it not happen
otherwise? _Can_ is an expression of potentiality, it denotes power or
possibility. The objection is, that it is not possible that the action
should otherwise happen. But why not? What deprives it of that power? If
a necessary action were in question, it could not otherwise happen than
as the necessitating cause shall compel; but then that would arise from
the necessitating cause solely, and not from the prescience of the
action which is not causal. But if the action be free, and it enter into
the very nature of a voluntary action to be unconstrained, then it might
have happened in a thousand other ways, or not have happened at all; the
foreknowledge of it no more affects its nature in this case than in the
other. All its potentiality, so to speak, still remains, independent of
foreknowledge, which neither adds to its power of happening otherwise,
nor diminishes it. But then we are told, that the prescience of it, in
that case, must be uncertain.” Not unless any person can prove, that the
divine prescience is unable to dart through all the workings of the
human mind, all its comparison of things in the judgment, all the
influences of motives on the affections, all the hesitances and haltings
of the will, to its final choice. Such knowledge is too wonderful for
us,” but it is the knowledge of Him who understandeth the thoughts of
man afar off.” “But if a contingency _will_ have a given result, to that
result it _must_ be determined.” Not in the least. We have seen that it
cannot be determined to a given result by mere precognition; for we have
evidence in our own minds that mere knowledge is not causal to the
actions of another. It is determined to its result by the will of the
agent; but even in that case, it cannot be said, that it _must_ be
determined to that result, because it is of the nature of freedom to be
unconstrained: so that here we have an instance in the case of a free
agent that he _will_ act in some particular manner; but it by no means
follows from what _will_ be, whether foreseen or not, that it _must_ be.
The third theory amounts, in brief, to this, that the foreknowledge of
God must be supposed to differ so much from any thing of the kind which
we perceive in ourselves, and from any ideas which we can possibly form
of that property of the divine nature, that no argument respecting it
can be grounded upon our imperfect notions; and that all controversy on
subjects connected with it, is idle and fruitless. But though
foreknowledge in God should be admitted to be something of a very
different nature” to the same quality in man, yet as it is represented
as _something_ equivalent to foreknowledge, whatever that something may
be, since in consequence of it, prophecies have actually been uttered
and fulfilled, and of such a kind, too, as relate to actions for which
men have in fact been held accountable; all the original difficulty of
reconciling contingent events to this something, of which human
foreknowledge is a kind of shadow,” as a map of China is to China
itself,” remains in full force. The difficulty is shifted, but not
removed. It may, therefore, be certainly concluded, if at least the Holy
Scriptures are to be our guide, that the omniscience of God comprehends
his certain prescience of all events however contingent; and if any
thing more were necessary to strengthen the argument above given, it
might be drawn from the irrational, and, above all, the unscriptural
consequences, which would follow from the denial of this doctrine. These
are forcibly stated by President Edwards:--“It would follow from this
notion, (namely, that the Almighty doth not foreknow what will be the
result of future contingencies,) that as God is liable to be continually
repenting what he has done; so he must be exposed to be constantly
changing his mind and intentions as to his future conduct; altering his
measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and
projections. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme,
namely, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always
liable to be broken, through want of foresight; and he must be
continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order,
through the contingence of the actions of moral agents: he must be a
Being who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be
the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance, and
changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason,
that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater
number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In
such a situation he must have little else to do, but to mend broken
links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and
disordered movements, in the best manner the case will allow. The
supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable
disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and has the
care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief
importance, which hereafter shall befall his system; which, if he did
but know, he might make seasonable provision for. In many cases, there
may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner
of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to
happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless consequence to the
universe; which he may see afterward, when it is too late, and may wish
in vain that he had known beforehand, that he might have ordered his
affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles,
by his devices, purposes, and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his
measures, make him continually to change his mind, subject him to
vexation, and bring him into confusion.”
Socinus and his early followers would not allow that God possesses any
knowledge of future contingencies. The schoolmen, in reference to this
species of knowledge in God, invented that called _scientia media_, and
which they define as that by which God knows _sub conditione_, what men
or angels will do according to the liberty which they have, when they
are placed in these or those circumstances, or in this or in that order
of things.” When Gomarus, the opponent of Arminius, found that his
opinion concerning the object of reprobation was clogged with this
absurdity--that it made God to be the author of Adam’s sin, he very
astutely took refuge in this conditionate foreknowledge, and, in his
corrected theses on predestination, published after the death of
Arminius, he describes it as that by which God, through the infinite
light of his own knowledge, foreknows some future things, not
absolutely, but as placed under a certain condition.” Walæus, the
celebrated antagonist of Episcopius, had recourse to the same expedient.
This distinction has been adopted by very few of those who espouse the
doctrines of general redemption; and who believe that every event, how
contingent soever to the creature, is, with respect to God, certainly
foreknown. An old English divine thinks, that, “in the sacred Scriptures
certain not obscure vestiges are apparent of this kind of knowledge, of
things that will happen thus or otherwise, on the supposition of the
occurrence of this or that circumstance. Omitting the well known example
of David in Keilah, 1 Sam. xxii, 12, and of Chorazin and Bethsaida,
Matt. xi, 21; Luke x, 13, consult, among other sayings of the same
description, the answer of our Saviour to the chief priests and scribes,
who had asked, ‘Art thou the Christ? Tell us.’ And he said unto them,
‘If I tell you, ye will not believe.’ In the subsequent verse he adds,
‘If I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor let me go,’ Luke xxii,
67, 68. You have here three events specified, which yet will not occur
even on the supposition of Christ our Lord himself.” This kind of
knowledge might very well be included in that of _scientia visionis_,
because the latter ought to include, not what God will do and what his
creatures will do under his appointment, but what they will do by his
permission as free agents, and what he will do, as a consequence of
this, in his character of Governor and Lord. But since the
predestinarians had confounded _scientia visionis_ with a predestinating
decree, the _scientia media_ well expressed what they had left quite
unaccounted for, and which they had assumed did not really exist,--the
actions of creatures endowed with free will, and the acts of Deity which
from eternity were consequent upon them. If such actions do not take
place, then men are not free; and if the rectoral acts of God are not
consequent upon the actions of the creature in the order of the divine
intention, and the conduct of the creature is consequent upon the
foreordained rectoral acts of God, then we reach a necessitating eternal
decree, which in fact, the predestinarian contends for; but it
unfortunately brings after it consequences which no subtleties have ever
been able to shake off,--that the only _actor_ in the universe is God
himself; and that the only distinction among events is, that one class
is brought to pass by God directly, and the other indirectly, not by the
agency, but by the mere instrumentality, of his creatures.
On this subject three leading theories have been resorted to, in order
to evade the difficulties which are supposed to be involved in the
opinion commonly received. The Chevalier Ramsay, among his other
speculations, holds it a matter of choice in God, to think of finite
ideas; and similar opinions, though variously worded, have been
occasionally adopted. In substance these opinions are, that though the
knowledge of God be infinite as his power is infinite, there is no more
reason to conclude, that his knowledge should be always exerted to the
full extent of its capacity, than that his power should be employed to
the extent of his omnipotence; and that if we suppose him to _choose_
not to know some contingencies, the infiniteness of his knowledge is not
thereby impugned. To this it may be answered, that the infinite power of
God is in Scripture represented, as in the nature of things it must be,
as an infinite capacity, and not as infinite in act; but that the
knowledge of God is on the contrary never represented there to us as a
capacity to acquire knowledge, but as actually comprehending all things
that are, and all things that can be. 2. That the notion of God’s
choosing to know some things, and not to know others, supposes a reason
why he refuses to know any class of things or events; which reason, it
would seem, can only arise out of their nature and circumstances, and
therefore supposes at least a partial knowledge of them, from which the
reason for his not choosing to know them arises. The doctrine is
therefore somewhat contradictory. But, 3. It is fatal to this opinion
that it does not at all meet the difficulty arising out of the question
of the consistency of divine prescience, and the free actions of men;
since some contingent actions, for which men have been made accountable,
we are sure, have been foreknown by God, because by his Spirit in the
prophets they were foretold; and if the freedom of man can in these
cases be reconciled to the prescience of God, there is no greater
difficulty in any other case which can possibly occur.
A second theory is, that the foreknowledge of contingent events, being
in its own nature impossible, because it implies a contradiction, it
does no dishonour to the divine Being to affirm, that of such events he
has, and can have, no prescience whatever; and thus the prescience of
God, as to moral actions, being wholly denied, the difficulty in
question is got rid of. To this the same answer must be given as to the
former. It does not meet the case, so long as the Scriptures are allowed
to contain prophecies of rewardable and punishable actions. The great
fallacy in the argument, that the certain prescience of a moral action
destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and
certainty are the opposites of each other. It is, perhaps, unfortunate,
that a word which is of figurative etymology, and which consequently can
only have an ideal application to such subjects, should have grown into
common use in this discussion, because it is more liable, on that
account, to present itself to different minds under different shades of
meaning. If, however, the term _contingent_ in this controversy has any
definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must
mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to
necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which results
from the choice of the agent, is distinguished from a necessary one in
this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, according to
the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this
specific quality of a free action, that the term contingency is used; it
might have been otherwise, in other words, it was not necessitated.
Contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom, and is
opposed, not to certainty, but to constraint. The very nature of this
controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question
is not, in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions, that is,
whether they _will_ happen or not; but about the nature of them, whether
free or constrained, whether they _must_ happen or not. Those who
advocate this theory care not about the certainty of actions, simply
considered, that is, whether they will take place or not; the reason why
they object to a certain prescience of moral actions, is this,--they
conclude, that such a prescience renders them necessary. It is the
quality of the action for which they contend, not whether it will happen
or not. If contingency meant _uncertainty_, the sense in which such
theorists take it, the dispute would be at an end. But though an
uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated
action may; for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action, in the
least, to affect its nature. Simple knowledge is, in no sense, a cause
of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with
exerted power: for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or
necessitated as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made a
voluntary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a
necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be
contingent. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on
the same ground. The certainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not
result from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the
necessitating cause; and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action
does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but
from the voluntary cause, that is, the determination of the will. It
alters not the case in the least, to say that the voluntary action might
have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would
have been otherwise; but as the will which gives birth to the action, is
not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of
the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will
nor the act is controlled by the knowledge; and the action, though
foreseen, is still free or contingent. The foreknowledge of God has then
no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for
this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions
may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by
that foreknowledge. But here it is said, If the result of an absolute
contingency be certainly foreknown, it _can_ have no other result, it
_cannot_ happen otherwise.” This is not the true inference. It _will_
not happen otherwise; but it may be asked, Why _can_ it not happen
otherwise? _Can_ is an expression of potentiality, it denotes power or
possibility. The objection is, that it is not possible that the action
should otherwise happen. But why not? What deprives it of that power? If
a necessary action were in question, it could not otherwise happen than
as the necessitating cause shall compel; but then that would arise from
the necessitating cause solely, and not from the prescience of the
action which is not causal. But if the action be free, and it enter into
the very nature of a voluntary action to be unconstrained, then it might
have happened in a thousand other ways, or not have happened at all; the
foreknowledge of it no more affects its nature in this case than in the
other. All its potentiality, so to speak, still remains, independent of
foreknowledge, which neither adds to its power of happening otherwise,
nor diminishes it. But then we are told, that the prescience of it, in
that case, must be uncertain.” Not unless any person can prove, that the
divine prescience is unable to dart through all the workings of the
human mind, all its comparison of things in the judgment, all the
influences of motives on the affections, all the hesitances and haltings
of the will, to its final choice. Such knowledge is too wonderful for
us,” but it is the knowledge of Him who understandeth the thoughts of
man afar off.” “But if a contingency _will_ have a given result, to that
result it _must_ be determined.” Not in the least. We have seen that it
cannot be determined to a given result by mere precognition; for we have
evidence in our own minds that mere knowledge is not causal to the
actions of another. It is determined to its result by the will of the
agent; but even in that case, it cannot be said, that it _must_ be
determined to that result, because it is of the nature of freedom to be
unconstrained: so that here we have an instance in the case of a free
agent that he _will_ act in some particular manner; but it by no means
follows from what _will_ be, whether foreseen or not, that it _must_ be.
The third theory amounts, in brief, to this, that the foreknowledge of
God must be supposed to differ so much from any thing of the kind which
we perceive in ourselves, and from any ideas which we can possibly form
of that property of the divine nature, that no argument respecting it
can be grounded upon our imperfect notions; and that all controversy on
subjects connected with it, is idle and fruitless. But though
foreknowledge in God should be admitted to be something of a very
different nature” to the same quality in man, yet as it is represented
as _something_ equivalent to foreknowledge, whatever that something may
be, since in consequence of it, prophecies have actually been uttered
and fulfilled, and of such a kind, too, as relate to actions for which
men have in fact been held accountable; all the original difficulty of
reconciling contingent events to this something, of which human
foreknowledge is a kind of shadow,” as a map of China is to China
itself,” remains in full force. The difficulty is shifted, but not
removed. It may, therefore, be certainly concluded, if at least the Holy
Scriptures are to be our guide, that the omniscience of God comprehends
his certain prescience of all events however contingent; and if any
thing more were necessary to strengthen the argument above given, it
might be drawn from the irrational, and, above all, the unscriptural
consequences, which would follow from the denial of this doctrine. These
are forcibly stated by President Edwards:--“It would follow from this
notion, (namely, that the Almighty doth not foreknow what will be the
result of future contingencies,) that as God is liable to be continually
repenting what he has done; so he must be exposed to be constantly
changing his mind and intentions as to his future conduct; altering his
measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and
projections. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme,
namely, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always
liable to be broken, through want of foresight; and he must be
continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order,
through the contingence of the actions of moral agents: he must be a
Being who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be
the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance, and
changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason,
that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater
number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In
such a situation he must have little else to do, but to mend broken
links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and
disordered movements, in the best manner the case will allow. The
supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable
disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and has the
care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief
importance, which hereafter shall befall his system; which, if he did
but know, he might make seasonable provision for. In many cases, there
may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner
of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to
happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless consequence to the
universe; which he may see afterward, when it is too late, and may wish
in vain that he had known beforehand, that he might have ordered his
affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles,
by his devices, purposes, and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his
measures, make him continually to change his mind, subject him to
vexation, and bring him into confusion.”
Socinus and his early followers would not allow that God possesses any
knowledge of future contingencies. The schoolmen, in reference to this
species of knowledge in God, invented that called _scientia media_, and
which they define as that by which God knows _sub conditione_, what men
or angels will do according to the liberty which they have, when they
are placed in these or those circumstances, or in this or in that order
of things.” When Gomarus, the opponent of Arminius, found that his
opinion concerning the object of reprobation was clogged with this
absurdity--that it made God to be the author of Adam’s sin, he very
astutely took refuge in this conditionate foreknowledge, and, in his
corrected theses on predestination, published after the death of
Arminius, he describes it as that by which God, through the infinite
light of his own knowledge, foreknows some future things, not
absolutely, but as placed under a certain condition.” Walæus, the
celebrated antagonist of Episcopius, had recourse to the same expedient.
This distinction has been adopted by very few of those who espouse the
doctrines of general redemption; and who believe that every event, how
contingent soever to the creature, is, with respect to God, certainly
foreknown. An old English divine thinks, that, “in the sacred Scriptures
certain not obscure vestiges are apparent of this kind of knowledge, of
things that will happen thus or otherwise, on the supposition of the
occurrence of this or that circumstance. Omitting the well known example
of David in Keilah, 1 Sam. xxii, 12, and of Chorazin and Bethsaida,
Matt. xi, 21; Luke x, 13, consult, among other sayings of the same
description, the answer of our Saviour to the chief priests and scribes,
who had asked, ‘Art thou the Christ? Tell us.’ And he said unto them,
‘If I tell you, ye will not believe.’ In the subsequent verse he adds,
‘If I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor let me go,’ Luke xxii,
67, 68. You have here three events specified, which yet will not occur
even on the supposition of Christ our Lord himself.” This kind of
knowledge might very well be included in that of _scientia visionis_,
because the latter ought to include, not what God will do and what his
creatures will do under his appointment, but what they will do by his
permission as free agents, and what he will do, as a consequence of
this, in his character of Governor and Lord. But since the
predestinarians had confounded _scientia visionis_ with a predestinating
decree, the _scientia media_ well expressed what they had left quite
unaccounted for, and which they had assumed did not really exist,--the
actions of creatures endowed with free will, and the acts of Deity which
from eternity were consequent upon them. If such actions do not take
place, then men are not free; and if the rectoral acts of God are not
consequent upon the actions of the creature in the order of the divine
intention, and the conduct of the creature is consequent upon the
foreordained rectoral acts of God, then we reach a necessitating eternal
decree, which in fact, the predestinarian contends for; but it
unfortunately brings after it consequences which no subtleties have ever
been able to shake off,--that the only _actor_ in the universe is God
himself; and that the only distinction among events is, that one class
is brought to pass by God directly, and the other indirectly, not by the
agency, but by the mere instrumentality, of his creatures.