the conduct and direction of the several parts of the
universe, by a superior intelligent Being. The notion of a providence is
founded upon this truth, that the Creator has not so fixed and
ascertained the laws of nature, nor so connected the chain of second
causes, as to leave the world to itself, but that he still preserves the
reins in his own hands, and occasionally intervenes, alters, restrains,
enforces, suspends, &c, those laws by a particular providence. Some use
the word _providence_ in a more general sense, signifying by it that
power or action by which the several parts of the creation are
ordinarily directed. Thus Damascenus defines providence to be that
divine will by which all things are ordered and directed to the proper
end: which notion of providence supposes no laws at all fixed by the
author of nature at the creation, but that he reserved it at large, to
be governed by himself immediately. The Epicureans denied any divine
providence, as thinking it inconsistent with the ease and repose of the
divine nature to meddle at all with human affairs. Simplicius argues
thus for a providence: If God does not look to the affairs of the world,
it is either because he cannot or will not; but the first is absurd,
since, to govern cannot be difficult where to create was easy; and the
latter is both absurd and blasphemous. In Plato’s Tenth Dialogue of
Laws, he teaches excellently, that (since what is self-moving is, by its
nature, before that which moves only in consequence of being moved) mind
must be prior to matter, and the cause of all its modifications and
changes; and that, therefore, there is a universal Mind possessed of all
perfection, which produced and which actuates all things. After this he
shows that the Deity exercises a particular providence over the world,
taking care of small no less than great things. In proving this he
observes “that a superior nature of such excellence as the divine, which
hears, sees, and knows all things, cannot, in any instance, be subject
to negligence or sloth; that the meanest and the greatest part of the
world are all equally his work or possession; that great things cannot
be rightly taken care of without taking care of small; and that, in all
cases, the more able and perfect any artist is, (as a physician, an
architect, or the ruler of the state,) the more his skill and care
appear in little as well as great things. Let us not, then,” says he,
“conceive of God as worse than even mortal artists.”
The term providence, in its primary signification, simply denotes
foresight; and if we allow the existence of a supreme Being who formed
the universe at first, we must necessarily allow that he has a perfect
foresight of every event which at any time takes place in the natural or
moral world. Matter can have no motion, nor spirit any energy, but what
is derived from him; nor can he be ignorant of the effects which they
will, either separately or conjointly, produce. A common mechanic has
knowledge of the work of his own hands: when he puts the machine which
he has made in motion, he foresees how long it will go, and what will be
the state and position of its several parts at any particular point of
time; or, if he is not perfectly able to do this, it is because he is
not perfectly acquainted with all the powers of the materials which he
has used in its construction: they are not of his making, and they may
therefore have qualities which he does not understand, and consequently
cannot regulate. But in the immense machine of the universe there is
nothing except that which God has made; all the powers and properties,
relations and dependencies, which created things have, they have, both
in kind and degree, from him. Nothing, therefore, it should seem, can
come to pass at any time, or in any part of the universe, which its
incomprehensible Architect did not, from the moment his almighty fiat
called it into existence, clearly foresee. The providence of God is
implied in his very existence as an intelligent Creator; and it imports
not only an abstract foresight of all possible events, but such a
predisposition of causes and effects, such an adjustment of means and
ends, as seems to us to exclude that contingency of human actions with
which, as expectants of positive rewards and punishments in another
world, we firmly believe it to be altogether consistent.
By providence we may understand, not merely foresight, but a uniform and
constant operation of God subsequent to the act of creation. Thus, in
every machine formed by human ingenuity, there is a necessity for the
action of some extraneous power to put the machine in motion: a proper
construction and disposition of parts not being sufficient to effect the
end: there must be a spring, or a weight, or an impulse of air or water,
or some substance or other, on which the motion of the several parts of
the machine must depend. In like manner, the machine of the universe
depends upon its Creator for the commencement and the conservation of
the motion of its several parts. The power by which the insensible
particles of matter coalesce into sensible lumps, as well as that by
which the great orbs of the universe are reluctantly, as it were,
retained in their courses, admits not an explanation from mechanical
causes: the effects of both of them are different from such as mere
matter and motion can produce; they must ultimately be referred to God.
Vegetable and animal life and increase cannot be accounted for, without
recurring to him as the primary cause of both. In all these respects the
providence of God is something more than foresight; it is a continual
influence, a universal agency; “by him all things consist,” and “in him
we live, and move, and have our being.”
Much labour has been employed to account for all the phenomena of nature
by the powers of mechanism, or the necessary laws of matter and motion.
But this, as we imagine, cannot be done. The primary causes of things
must certainly be some powers and principles not mechanical, otherwise
we shall be reduced to the necessity of maintaining an endless
progression of motions communicated from matter to matter, without any
first mover; or of saying that the first impelling matter moved itself.
The former is an absurdity too great to be embraced by any one; and
there is reason to hope that the essential inactivity of matter is at
present so well understood, and so generally allowed, notwithstanding
some modern oppugners of this hypothesis, that there can be but few who
will care to assert the latter. All our reasonings about bodies, and the
whole of natural philosophy, are founded on the three laws of motion
laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, at the beginning of the “_Principia_.”
These laws express the plainest truths; but they would have neither
evidence nor meaning, were not inactivity contained in our idea of
matter. Should it be said that matter, though naturally inert, may be
made to be otherwise by divine power, this would be the same with saying
that matter may be made not to be matter. If inactivity belong to it at
all, it must belong to it as matter, or solid extension, and therefore
must be inseparable from it. Matter is figured, movable, discerptable,
inactive, and capable of communicating motion by impulse to other
matter: these are not accidental but primary qualities of matter.
Beside, matter void of inactivity, if we were to suppose it possible,
could produce no effects. The communication of motion, its direction,
the resistance it suffers, and its cessation, in a word, the whole
doctrine of motion cannot be consistently explained or clearly
understood without supposing the inertia of matter. Self-moving matter
must have thought and design, because, whenever matter moves, it must
move in some particular direction, and with some precise degree of
velocity; and as there is an infinity of these equally possible, it
cannot move itself without selecting one of these preferably to and
exclusively of all others, and therefore not without design. Moreover,
it may be plainly proved that matter cannot be the ultimate cause of the
phenomena of nature, or the agent which, by any powers inherent in
itself, produces the general laws of nature, without possessing the
highest degree of knowledge and wisdom; which might be easily evinced or
exemplified by adverting to the particular law of gravitation. “The
philosopher,” says an excellent writer, “who overlooks the laws of an
all-governing Deity in nature, contenting himself with the appearance of
the material universe only, and the mechanical laws of motion, neglects
what is most excellent, and prefers what is imperfect to what is
supremely perfect, finitude to infinity, what is narrow and weak to what
is unlimited and almighty, and what is perishing to what endures for
ever. Sir Isaac Newton thought it most unaccountable to exclude the
Deity _only_ out of the universe. It appeared to him much more just and
reasonable to suppose that the whole chain of causes, or the several
series of them, should centre in him as their source; and the whole
system appear depending on him the only independent cause.” If, then,
the Deity pervades and actuates the material world, and his unremitting
energy is the cause to which every effect in it must be traced; the
spiritual world, which is of greater consequence, cannot be disregarded
by him. Is there not one atom of matter on which he does not act; and is
there one living being about which he has no concern? Does not a stone
fall without him; and does, then, a man suffer without him? The
inanimate world is of no consequence, abstracted from its subserviency
to the animate and reasonable world: the former, therefore, must be
preserved and governed entirely with a view to the latter. But it is not
mere energy or the constant exertion of power that is discernible in the
frame or laws of the universe, in maintaining the succession of men, and
in producing men and other beings; but wisdom and skill are also
conspicuous in the structure of every object in the inanimate creation.
After a survey of the beauty and elegance of the works of nature, aided
by the perusal of Matt. vi, 28, &c, we may ask ourselves, Has God, in
the lowest of his works, been lavish of wisdom, beauty, and skill; and
is he sparing of these in the concerns of reasonable beings? Or does he
less regard order, propriety, and fitness in the determination of their
states? The answer is obvious. Providence also implies a particular
interposition of God in administering the affairs of individuals and
nations, and wholly distinct from that general and incessant exertion of
his power, by which he sustains the universe in existence.
The doctrine of providence may be evinced from the consideration of the
divine perfections. The first cause of all things must be regarded as a
being absolutely perfect; and the idea of absolute perfection
comprehends infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; hence we deduce the
doctrine of providence. The Deity cannot be an indifferent spectator of
the series of events in that world to which he has given being. His
goodness will as certainly engage him to direct them agreeably to the
ends of goodness, as his wisdom and power enable him to do it in the
most effectual manner. This conclusion is conformable to all our ideas
of those attributes. Could we call that being good who would refuse to
do any good which he is able to do without the least labour or
difficulty? God is present every where. He sees all that happens, and it
is in his power, with perfect ease, to order all for the best. Can he
then possess goodness, and at the same time not do this? A God without a
providence is undoubtedly a contradiction. Nothing is plainer than that
a being of perfect reason will, in every instance, take such care of the
universe as perfect reason requires. That supreme intelligence and love,
which are present to all things, and from whence all things sprung, must
govern all occurrences. These considerations prove what has been called
a _particular_, in opposition to a _general_, providence. We cannot
conceive of any reasons that can influence the Deity to exercise _any_
providence over the world, which are not likewise reasons for extending
it to _all_ that happens in the world. As far as it is confined to
generals, or overlooks _any_ individual, or _any_ event, it is
incomplete, and therefore unsuitable to the idea of a perfect being.
One common prejudice against this doctrine arises from the apprehension
that it is below the dignity of the Deity to watch over, in the manner
implied in it, the meanest beings, and the minutest affairs. To which it
may be replied, that a great number of minute affairs, if they are each
of them of some consequence, make up a sum which is of great
consequence; and that there is no way of taking care of this sum,
without taking care of each particular. This objection, therefore, under
the appearance of honouring God, plainly dishonours him. Nothing is
absolutely trifling in which the happiness of any individual, even the
most insignificant, is at all concerned; nor is it beneath a wise and
good being to interpose in any thing of this kind. To suppose the Deity
above this, is to suppose him above acting up to the full extent of
goodness and rectitude. The same eternal benevolence that first engaged
him to produce beings, must also engage him to exercise a particular
providence over them; and the very lowest beings, as well as the
highest, seem to have a kind of right to his superintendence, from the
act itself of bringing them into existence. Every apprehension that this
is too great a condescension in him is founded on the poorest ideas;
for, surely, whatever it was not too great condescension in him to
create, it cannot be too great a condescension in him to take care of.
Beside, with regard to God, all distinctions in the creation vanish. All
beings are infinitely, that is, equally, inferior to him.
Accident, and chance, and fortune, are words which we often hear
mentioned, and much is ascribed to them in the life of man. But they are
words without meaning; or, as far as they have any signification, they
are no other than names for the unknown operations of providence; for it
is certain that in God’s universe nothing comes to pass causelessly, or
in vain. Every event has its own determined direction. That chaos of
human affairs and intrigues where we can see no light, that mass of
disorder and confusion which they often present to our view, is all
clearness and order in the sight of Him who is governing and directing
the whole, and bringing forward every event in its due time and place.
“The Lord sitteth on the flood. The Lord maketh the wrath of man to
praise him,” as he maketh the “hail and rain to obey his word. He hath
prepared his throne in the heavens; and his kingdom ruleth over all. A
man’s heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps.” No
other principle than this, embraced with a steady faith, and attended
with a suitable practice, can ever be able to give repose and
tranquillity to the mind; to animate our hopes, or extinguish our fears;
to give us any true satisfaction in the enjoyments of life, or to
minister consolation under its adversities. If we are persuaded that God
governs the world, that he has the superintendence and direction of all
events, and that we are the objects of his providential care; whatever
may be our distress or our danger, we can never want consolation; we may
always have a fund of hope, always a prospect of relief. But take away
this hope and this prospect, take away the belief of God and of a
superintending providence, and man would be of all creatures the most
miserable; destitute of every comfort, every support, under present
sufferings, and of every security against future dangers.
universe, by a superior intelligent Being. The notion of a providence is
founded upon this truth, that the Creator has not so fixed and
ascertained the laws of nature, nor so connected the chain of second
causes, as to leave the world to itself, but that he still preserves the
reins in his own hands, and occasionally intervenes, alters, restrains,
enforces, suspends, &c, those laws by a particular providence. Some use
the word _providence_ in a more general sense, signifying by it that
power or action by which the several parts of the creation are
ordinarily directed. Thus Damascenus defines providence to be that
divine will by which all things are ordered and directed to the proper
end: which notion of providence supposes no laws at all fixed by the
author of nature at the creation, but that he reserved it at large, to
be governed by himself immediately. The Epicureans denied any divine
providence, as thinking it inconsistent with the ease and repose of the
divine nature to meddle at all with human affairs. Simplicius argues
thus for a providence: If God does not look to the affairs of the world,
it is either because he cannot or will not; but the first is absurd,
since, to govern cannot be difficult where to create was easy; and the
latter is both absurd and blasphemous. In Plato’s Tenth Dialogue of
Laws, he teaches excellently, that (since what is self-moving is, by its
nature, before that which moves only in consequence of being moved) mind
must be prior to matter, and the cause of all its modifications and
changes; and that, therefore, there is a universal Mind possessed of all
perfection, which produced and which actuates all things. After this he
shows that the Deity exercises a particular providence over the world,
taking care of small no less than great things. In proving this he
observes “that a superior nature of such excellence as the divine, which
hears, sees, and knows all things, cannot, in any instance, be subject
to negligence or sloth; that the meanest and the greatest part of the
world are all equally his work or possession; that great things cannot
be rightly taken care of without taking care of small; and that, in all
cases, the more able and perfect any artist is, (as a physician, an
architect, or the ruler of the state,) the more his skill and care
appear in little as well as great things. Let us not, then,” says he,
“conceive of God as worse than even mortal artists.”
The term providence, in its primary signification, simply denotes
foresight; and if we allow the existence of a supreme Being who formed
the universe at first, we must necessarily allow that he has a perfect
foresight of every event which at any time takes place in the natural or
moral world. Matter can have no motion, nor spirit any energy, but what
is derived from him; nor can he be ignorant of the effects which they
will, either separately or conjointly, produce. A common mechanic has
knowledge of the work of his own hands: when he puts the machine which
he has made in motion, he foresees how long it will go, and what will be
the state and position of its several parts at any particular point of
time; or, if he is not perfectly able to do this, it is because he is
not perfectly acquainted with all the powers of the materials which he
has used in its construction: they are not of his making, and they may
therefore have qualities which he does not understand, and consequently
cannot regulate. But in the immense machine of the universe there is
nothing except that which God has made; all the powers and properties,
relations and dependencies, which created things have, they have, both
in kind and degree, from him. Nothing, therefore, it should seem, can
come to pass at any time, or in any part of the universe, which its
incomprehensible Architect did not, from the moment his almighty fiat
called it into existence, clearly foresee. The providence of God is
implied in his very existence as an intelligent Creator; and it imports
not only an abstract foresight of all possible events, but such a
predisposition of causes and effects, such an adjustment of means and
ends, as seems to us to exclude that contingency of human actions with
which, as expectants of positive rewards and punishments in another
world, we firmly believe it to be altogether consistent.
By providence we may understand, not merely foresight, but a uniform and
constant operation of God subsequent to the act of creation. Thus, in
every machine formed by human ingenuity, there is a necessity for the
action of some extraneous power to put the machine in motion: a proper
construction and disposition of parts not being sufficient to effect the
end: there must be a spring, or a weight, or an impulse of air or water,
or some substance or other, on which the motion of the several parts of
the machine must depend. In like manner, the machine of the universe
depends upon its Creator for the commencement and the conservation of
the motion of its several parts. The power by which the insensible
particles of matter coalesce into sensible lumps, as well as that by
which the great orbs of the universe are reluctantly, as it were,
retained in their courses, admits not an explanation from mechanical
causes: the effects of both of them are different from such as mere
matter and motion can produce; they must ultimately be referred to God.
Vegetable and animal life and increase cannot be accounted for, without
recurring to him as the primary cause of both. In all these respects the
providence of God is something more than foresight; it is a continual
influence, a universal agency; “by him all things consist,” and “in him
we live, and move, and have our being.”
Much labour has been employed to account for all the phenomena of nature
by the powers of mechanism, or the necessary laws of matter and motion.
But this, as we imagine, cannot be done. The primary causes of things
must certainly be some powers and principles not mechanical, otherwise
we shall be reduced to the necessity of maintaining an endless
progression of motions communicated from matter to matter, without any
first mover; or of saying that the first impelling matter moved itself.
The former is an absurdity too great to be embraced by any one; and
there is reason to hope that the essential inactivity of matter is at
present so well understood, and so generally allowed, notwithstanding
some modern oppugners of this hypothesis, that there can be but few who
will care to assert the latter. All our reasonings about bodies, and the
whole of natural philosophy, are founded on the three laws of motion
laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, at the beginning of the “_Principia_.”
These laws express the plainest truths; but they would have neither
evidence nor meaning, were not inactivity contained in our idea of
matter. Should it be said that matter, though naturally inert, may be
made to be otherwise by divine power, this would be the same with saying
that matter may be made not to be matter. If inactivity belong to it at
all, it must belong to it as matter, or solid extension, and therefore
must be inseparable from it. Matter is figured, movable, discerptable,
inactive, and capable of communicating motion by impulse to other
matter: these are not accidental but primary qualities of matter.
Beside, matter void of inactivity, if we were to suppose it possible,
could produce no effects. The communication of motion, its direction,
the resistance it suffers, and its cessation, in a word, the whole
doctrine of motion cannot be consistently explained or clearly
understood without supposing the inertia of matter. Self-moving matter
must have thought and design, because, whenever matter moves, it must
move in some particular direction, and with some precise degree of
velocity; and as there is an infinity of these equally possible, it
cannot move itself without selecting one of these preferably to and
exclusively of all others, and therefore not without design. Moreover,
it may be plainly proved that matter cannot be the ultimate cause of the
phenomena of nature, or the agent which, by any powers inherent in
itself, produces the general laws of nature, without possessing the
highest degree of knowledge and wisdom; which might be easily evinced or
exemplified by adverting to the particular law of gravitation. “The
philosopher,” says an excellent writer, “who overlooks the laws of an
all-governing Deity in nature, contenting himself with the appearance of
the material universe only, and the mechanical laws of motion, neglects
what is most excellent, and prefers what is imperfect to what is
supremely perfect, finitude to infinity, what is narrow and weak to what
is unlimited and almighty, and what is perishing to what endures for
ever. Sir Isaac Newton thought it most unaccountable to exclude the
Deity _only_ out of the universe. It appeared to him much more just and
reasonable to suppose that the whole chain of causes, or the several
series of them, should centre in him as their source; and the whole
system appear depending on him the only independent cause.” If, then,
the Deity pervades and actuates the material world, and his unremitting
energy is the cause to which every effect in it must be traced; the
spiritual world, which is of greater consequence, cannot be disregarded
by him. Is there not one atom of matter on which he does not act; and is
there one living being about which he has no concern? Does not a stone
fall without him; and does, then, a man suffer without him? The
inanimate world is of no consequence, abstracted from its subserviency
to the animate and reasonable world: the former, therefore, must be
preserved and governed entirely with a view to the latter. But it is not
mere energy or the constant exertion of power that is discernible in the
frame or laws of the universe, in maintaining the succession of men, and
in producing men and other beings; but wisdom and skill are also
conspicuous in the structure of every object in the inanimate creation.
After a survey of the beauty and elegance of the works of nature, aided
by the perusal of Matt. vi, 28, &c, we may ask ourselves, Has God, in
the lowest of his works, been lavish of wisdom, beauty, and skill; and
is he sparing of these in the concerns of reasonable beings? Or does he
less regard order, propriety, and fitness in the determination of their
states? The answer is obvious. Providence also implies a particular
interposition of God in administering the affairs of individuals and
nations, and wholly distinct from that general and incessant exertion of
his power, by which he sustains the universe in existence.
The doctrine of providence may be evinced from the consideration of the
divine perfections. The first cause of all things must be regarded as a
being absolutely perfect; and the idea of absolute perfection
comprehends infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; hence we deduce the
doctrine of providence. The Deity cannot be an indifferent spectator of
the series of events in that world to which he has given being. His
goodness will as certainly engage him to direct them agreeably to the
ends of goodness, as his wisdom and power enable him to do it in the
most effectual manner. This conclusion is conformable to all our ideas
of those attributes. Could we call that being good who would refuse to
do any good which he is able to do without the least labour or
difficulty? God is present every where. He sees all that happens, and it
is in his power, with perfect ease, to order all for the best. Can he
then possess goodness, and at the same time not do this? A God without a
providence is undoubtedly a contradiction. Nothing is plainer than that
a being of perfect reason will, in every instance, take such care of the
universe as perfect reason requires. That supreme intelligence and love,
which are present to all things, and from whence all things sprung, must
govern all occurrences. These considerations prove what has been called
a _particular_, in opposition to a _general_, providence. We cannot
conceive of any reasons that can influence the Deity to exercise _any_
providence over the world, which are not likewise reasons for extending
it to _all_ that happens in the world. As far as it is confined to
generals, or overlooks _any_ individual, or _any_ event, it is
incomplete, and therefore unsuitable to the idea of a perfect being.
One common prejudice against this doctrine arises from the apprehension
that it is below the dignity of the Deity to watch over, in the manner
implied in it, the meanest beings, and the minutest affairs. To which it
may be replied, that a great number of minute affairs, if they are each
of them of some consequence, make up a sum which is of great
consequence; and that there is no way of taking care of this sum,
without taking care of each particular. This objection, therefore, under
the appearance of honouring God, plainly dishonours him. Nothing is
absolutely trifling in which the happiness of any individual, even the
most insignificant, is at all concerned; nor is it beneath a wise and
good being to interpose in any thing of this kind. To suppose the Deity
above this, is to suppose him above acting up to the full extent of
goodness and rectitude. The same eternal benevolence that first engaged
him to produce beings, must also engage him to exercise a particular
providence over them; and the very lowest beings, as well as the
highest, seem to have a kind of right to his superintendence, from the
act itself of bringing them into existence. Every apprehension that this
is too great a condescension in him is founded on the poorest ideas;
for, surely, whatever it was not too great condescension in him to
create, it cannot be too great a condescension in him to take care of.
Beside, with regard to God, all distinctions in the creation vanish. All
beings are infinitely, that is, equally, inferior to him.
Accident, and chance, and fortune, are words which we often hear
mentioned, and much is ascribed to them in the life of man. But they are
words without meaning; or, as far as they have any signification, they
are no other than names for the unknown operations of providence; for it
is certain that in God’s universe nothing comes to pass causelessly, or
in vain. Every event has its own determined direction. That chaos of
human affairs and intrigues where we can see no light, that mass of
disorder and confusion which they often present to our view, is all
clearness and order in the sight of Him who is governing and directing
the whole, and bringing forward every event in its due time and place.
“The Lord sitteth on the flood. The Lord maketh the wrath of man to
praise him,” as he maketh the “hail and rain to obey his word. He hath
prepared his throne in the heavens; and his kingdom ruleth over all. A
man’s heart deviseth his way, but the Lord directeth his steps.” No
other principle than this, embraced with a steady faith, and attended
with a suitable practice, can ever be able to give repose and
tranquillity to the mind; to animate our hopes, or extinguish our fears;
to give us any true satisfaction in the enjoyments of life, or to
minister consolation under its adversities. If we are persuaded that God
governs the world, that he has the superintendence and direction of all
events, and that we are the objects of his providential care; whatever
may be our distress or our danger, we can never want consolation; we may
always have a fund of hope, always a prospect of relief. But take away
this hope and this prospect, take away the belief of God and of a
superintending providence, and man would be of all creatures the most
miserable; destitute of every comfort, every support, under present
sufferings, and of every security against future dangers.