“In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his
Creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness, and
power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to
perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him:
yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of
divine grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of
and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really
good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his
intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ
through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand,
esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is
made a partaker of this regeneration, or renovation, since he is
delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing, and doing that
which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of divine grace.”
Such were the sentiments of the often misrepresented Arminius on this
subject; to which is only to be added, to complete the Scriptural view,
that a degree of grace to consider his ways, and to return to God, is
through the merit of Christ vouchsafed to every man. Every one must be
conscious that he possesses free will, and that he is a free agent; that
is, that he is capable of considering and reflecting upon the objects
which are presented to his mind, and of acting, in such cases as are
possible, according to the determination of his will. And, indeed,
without this free agency, actions cannot be morally good or bad; nor can
the agents be responsible for their conduct. But the corruption
introduced into our nature by the fall of Adam has so weakened our
mental powers, has given such force to our passions, and such
perverseness to our wills, that a man “cannot turn and prepare himself
by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon
God.” The most pious of those who lived under the Mosaic dispensation
often acknowledged the necessity of extraordinary assistance from God:
David prays to God to open his eyes, to guide and direct him; to create
in him a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within him, Psalm li, 10;
cxix, 18, 33, 35. Even we, whose minds are enlightened by the pure
precepts of the Gospel, and urged by the motives which it suggests, must
still be convinced of our weakness and depravity, and confess, in the
words of the tenth article, that “we have no power to do good works
pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God preventing us,
that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good
will.” The necessity of divine grace to strengthen and regulate our
wills, and to coöperate with our endeavours after righteousness, is
clearly asserted in the New Testament: “They that are in the flesh
cannot please God,” Rom. viii, 8. “Abide in me,” says our Saviour, “and
I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in
the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, and ye
are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth
forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing,” John xv, 4, 5. “No
man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him.”
“It is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good
pleasure,” Phil. ii, 13. “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to
think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God,” 2 Cor.
iii, 5. “We know not what to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit
helpeth our infirmities,” Rom. viii, 26. We are said to be “led by the
Spirit,” and to “walk in the Spirit,” Rom. viii, 14; Gal. v, 16, 25.
These texts sufficiently prove that we stand in need both of a
prevenient and of a coöperating grace. This doctrine we find asserted in
many of the ancient fathers, and particularly in Ambrose, who, in
speaking of the effects of the fall, uses these words: “Thence was
derived mortality, and no less a multitude of miseries than of crimes.
Faith being lost, hope being abandoned, the understanding blinded, and
the will made captive, no one found in himself the means of repairing
these things. Without the worship of the true God, even that which seems
to be virtue is sin; nor can any one please God without God. But whom
does he please who does not please God, except himself and Satan? The
nature therefore, which was good is made bad by habit: man would not
return unless God turned him.” And Cyprian says, “We pray day and night
that the sanctification and enlivening, which springs from the grace of
God, may be preserved by his protection.” Dr. Nicholls, after quoting
many authorities to show that the doctrine of divine grace always
prevailed in the catholic church, adds, “I have spent, perhaps, more
time in these testimonies than was absolutely necessary; but whatever I
have done is to show that the doctrine of divine grace is so essential a
doctrine of Christianity, that not only the Holy Scriptures and the
primitive fathers assert it, but likewise that the Christians could not
in any age maintain their religion without it,--it being necessary, not
only for the discharge of Christian duties, but for the performance of
our ordinary devotions.” And this seems to have been the opinion of the
compilers of our excellent liturgy, in many parts of which both a
prevenient and a coöperating grace is unequivocally acknowledged;
particularly in the second collect for the evening service; in the
fourth collect at the end of the communion service; in the collect for
Easter day; in the collect for the fifth Sunday after Easter; in the
collects for the third, ninth, seventeenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fifth
Sundays after Trinity. This assistance of divine grace is not
inconsistent with the free agency of men: it does not place them under
an irresistible restraint, or compel them to act contrary to their will.
Our own exertions are necessary to enable us to work out our salvation;
but our sufficiency for that purpose is from God. It is, however,
impossible to ascertain the precise boundary between our natural efforts
and the divine assistance, whether that assistance be considered as a
coöperating or a prevenient grace. Without destroying our character as
free and accountable beings, God may be mercifully pleased to counteract
the depravity of our hearts by the suggestions of his Spirit; but still
it remains with us to choose whether we will listen to those
suggestions, or obey the lusts of the flesh. We may rest assured that he
will, by the communication of his grace, varied often as to power and
distinctness, help our infirmities, invigorate our resolutions, and
supply our defects. The promises that if we draw nigh to God, God will
draw nigh to us, and pour out his Spirit upon us, James iv, 8; Acts ii,
17, and that he will give his Holy Spirit to every one that asketh him,
Luke xi, 13, imply that God is ever ready to work upon our hearts, and
to aid our well-doing through the powerful, though invisible, operation
of his Spirit: “The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the
sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth;
so is every one that is born of the Spirit,” John iii, 8. The joint
agency of God and man, in the work of human salvation, is pointed out in
the following passage: “Work out your own salvation with fear and
trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of
his good pleasure,” Phil, ii, 12, 13; and therefore we may assure
ourselves that free will and grace are not incompatible, though the mode
and degree of their coöperation be utterly inexplicable, and though at
different times one may appear for a season to overwhelm the other. This
doctrine has, however, been the subject of much dispute among
Christians: some sects contend for the irresistible impulses of grace,
and others reject the idea of any influence of the divine Spirit upon
the human mind. The former opinion seems irreconcilable with the free
agency of man, if held as the constant unvarying mode in which he
carries on his work in the soul of man, and the latter contradicts the
authority of Scripture; “and therefore,” says Veneer, “let us neither
ascribe nothing to free will, nor too much; let us not, with the
defenders of irresistible grace, deny free will, or make it of no
effect, not only before, but even under, grace; nor let us suffer the
efficacy of saving grace, on the other hand, to be swallowed up in the
strength and freedom of our wills; but, allowing the government or
superiority to the grace of God, let the will of man be admitted to be
its handmaid, but such a one as is free, and freely obeys; by which,
when it is freely excited by the admonitions of prevenient grace, when
it is prepared as to its affections, strengthened and assisted as to its
powers and faculties, a man freely and willingly coöperates with God,
that the grace of God be not received in vain.” “All men are also to be
admonished,” observes Cranmer, in his “Necessary Doctrine,” “and chiefly
preachers, that in this high matter they, looking on both sides, so
temper and moderate themselves, that they neither so preach the grace of
God that they take away thereby free will, nor on the other side so
extol free will, that injury be done to the grace of God.” And Jortin
remarks: “Thus do the doctrine of divine grace and the doctrine of free
will or human liberty unite and conspire, in a friendly manner, to our
everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith,
and humility; the second, to awaken our caution and quicken our
diligence.”
Many, indeed, relying on mere abstract arguments, deny free will, in the
strict meaning of the term, altogether, and define the mental faculties
of man according to their various fancies. But the existence and nature
of our moral and rational powers are and ought to be, in true
philosophy, the subject of mental observation, not the sport of
hypothesis. Those who love metaphysical abstractions may people the
worlds of their imagination with beings of whatsoever character they
prefer; but the nature and capabilities of man, as he really is, must be
determined not by speculation but by experience. It is true that this
experience is the object of consciousness, not of the senses; and,
accordingly, each man is, in some respect, the judge in his own case,
and may, if he chooses, deny his own freedom and his power of self
control, or of using those means which God hath appointed to lead to
this result. But this is seldom done in ordinary life, except by those
abandoned individuals who seek, in such a statement, an excuse for
capricious or unprincipled conduct,--an excuse which is never admitted
by the majority of reasoning persons, much less by the truly pious. The
latter, indeed, will always be found attributing any thing good they
achieve to the coöperating efficacy of superior assistance. But they
will, with equal sincerity, blame themselves for what they have done
amiss; or, in other words, acknowledge that they should and might have
willed and acted otherwise; and this is exactly the practical question,
the very turning point, on which the whole controversy hinges. The only
competent judges in such a question, says Dr. R. H. Graves, are those
who have made it the subject of mental observation, exertion, and
pursuit; or, in other words, those who have sought after righteousness,
under whatever dispensation, Acts x, 35; Romans ii, 7, 10. And surely
the confessions, the prayers, the repentance, and the sacrifices, of the
humble and pious of all ages show that they felt, not only that they
were themselves to blame for their actions, and therefore that they
might have done otherwise, that is, they had a free will, but that, to
make this will operative in spiritual matters, they required an aid
beyond the reach of mere human attainment. Some may fancy this statement
inconsistent in itself; and I allow that it cannot satisfy the mere
speculative supporters either of free will or its opponents. But to me
it seems the testimony of conscience and experience, which, in natural
religion, must, as I conceive, be preferred to abstract hypothesis. The
inquiry is not how the mind _may be_, but how it _is actually_,
constituted. This surely is a question of fact, not of conjecture, and
must therefore be decided by an appeal to common sense and experience,
not by random speculation. Again: even those who in theory contend for
the doctrine of necessity, yet in all the affairs of life where their
interests, comforts, or gratifications are concerned, both speak and act
as if they disbelieved it, and as if they really imagined themselves
capable of such self determination and self control, as to improve their
talents, their opportunities, and their acquirements, and so to exercise
a material influence on their worldly fortunes. But suppose the
assertions of individuals, as to their consciousness in this particular,
to disagree. It is then evident, that, the question being as to the
nature of man in general, it must be determined by the voice of
preponderating testimony. But how, it may be asked, are the suffrages to
be collected? Since the judgment of each individual must in this scheme
be considered as a separate fact, how is a sufficiently extensive
induction to be made? In answer, it may be asserted, that in every
civilized nation the induction has been already made, the suffrages have
been taken, the case has been tried, and the decision is on record. And
the verdict is the most impartial that can be looked for in such a case,
because given without any reference to the controversy in dispute. All
human laws, forbidding, condemning, and punishing vicious actions, are
grounded on the acknowledged supposition that man is possessed of a self
control, a self determining power, by which he could, both in will and
in deed, have avoided the very actions for which he is condemned, and in
the very circumstances in which he has committed them. Nor would it be
easy to find a case where the criminal has deceived himself, or hoped to
deceive his judges, by pleading that he laboured under a fatal
necessity, which rendered his crimes unavoidable, and therefore
excusable. The justice of all legislative enactments evidently and
essentially depends on the principle, that the things prohibited can be
avoided, or, in other words, might have been done otherwise than they
were done; and this is the very turning point of the controversy.
Accordingly, in whatever instances such freedom of will is not
presupposed, (as in the cases of idiots and madmen,) the operation of
such enactments is suspended. All nations, therefore, who consent to
frame and abide by such laws, do thereby testify their deliberate and
solemn assent to the truth of this principle, and, consequently, to the
existence of free will in man; and do certify the sincerity of their
conviction by staking upon it their properties, their liberties, and
their lives. Numberless other instances might be adduced in which the
practice of mankind implies their belief in this principle. And so
conscious of this are the opponents of free will, that they generally
deprecate appeals to common sense and experience, and resort to
metaphysical arguments to examine what is in truth a matter of truth,
not of conjecture; or, in other words, to determine, not what man is,
but what they imagine he _must be_. In their reasonings they differ, as
might have been expected, as much from each other as they do from truth
and reality. But the experience of common sense and conscience will
always decide, that no man can conscientiously make this excuse for his
crimes, that he could not have willed or acted otherwise than he did.
The existence of the above faculties in the human mind once acknowledged
leads, by necessary inference, to the admission, that there exists in
the great First Cause a power to create them. Not, indeed, that these
faculties themselves exist in him in the same manner as in us, but the
power of originating and producing them in all possible variety. We can
indeed conclude, that having created all these in us, his nature must be
so perfect that we cannot attribute to him any line of conduct
inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of these
faculties in ourselves. And therefore we cannot ascribe to him, as his
special act, any thing we should perceive to be unworthy of any just or
merciful, any wise or upright, being. But this furnishes no clue
whatever to a knowledge of the real constitution of his nature, or of
the manner in which his divine attributes exist together. In truth, we
no more comprehend how he wills than how he acts, and therefore we have
no better right to assert that he wills evil than that he does evil.
Again: we as little understand how he knows as how he sees, and
therefore might as well argue that all things exist in consequence of
his beholding them, as that all events arise in consequence of his
foreknowing them. In short, all that can be inferred by reason
concerning the intrinsic nature of the invisible, unsearchable Deity,
must be admitted by the candid inquirer to be no better than conjecture.
And he who should hope from such doubtful support as his fancied insight
into the unknown operations of the divine mind to suspend a system of
irrespective decrees, embracing the moral government of the world, would
but too much resemble him who should imagine the material globe
adequately sustained if upheld by a chain whose highest links were
wrapped in clouds and darkness. Thus our affirmative knowledge of the
Deity, as derived from this part of our inquiry, consists in the
certainty, (though his nature is unknown to us,) that he is the creative
source of all that is great, glorious, and good in heaven or in earth;
while we may negatively conclude, that his moral government shall, on
the whole, be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with whatever is
excellent in the exercise of power and wisdom, justice and mercy,
goodness and truth. Nor is it a little important, as connected with the
present inquiry, to keep in mind this distinction between our
affirmative and negative knowledge in this matter. For it shows us that
as, on the one side, we cannot pretend to such an insight into the
nature and character of the divine knowledge as to deduce therefrom a
system of eternal and irrespective decrees; so neither, on the other,
can this system of moral government be ascribed to the Deity, because it
would be manifestly unworthy, not merely of him who has created all
moral excellence, but of any of those beings on whom he has conferred
the most ordinary degrees of mercy and justice. The natural benefits or
evils arising out of moral or immoral practices are, in fact, so many
rewards or punishments, exhibiting the Being who has so constituted our
nature as a moral governor. This part of his government may not be so
clearly discernible in individual instances, because much of the
happiness and unhappiness attending virtue and vice is mental and
invisible. In the case of nations, however, considered merely as bodies
politic, the internal sanction of an approving or reproaching
conscience, of subdued or distracting passions, can have no existence;
and therefore the external sanctions are more uniformly enforced. Hence,
whoever carefully examines the dealings of Providence with the human
race will admit, that national prosperity has ever kept pace with
national wisdom and integrity; whereas, the greatest empires, when once
corrupted, have soon become the prey of internal strife or foreign
domination. Again: man is made for society, and cannot exist without it:
consequently, all the regulations which are really conducive to the
maintenance of civil policy and social order must be regarded as evident
consequences of our nature, when enlightened to the rational pursuit of
its own advantage; and therefore should be considered as intimations of
a moral government, carried on through their intervention. In addition
to which, it ought to be observed, that these laws may be regarded in
another point of view,--as a most important class of moral phenomena;
inasmuch as they virtually exhibit the most unexceptionable declarations
of reason on this subject, because they are collected from the common
consent of mankind, and therefore rendered, in a great measure,
independent of the obliquities of individual intellect, the errors of
private judgment, and the partial views of self interest, prejudice, or
passion. But all the laws of civilized nations, both in their enactment
and administration, not only presuppose certain notions concerning the
freedom and accountableness of man, the merit and demerit of human
actions, and the inseparable connection of virtue and vice with rewards
and punishments, but greatly contribute to fix and perpetuate these
notions. It is therefore evidently the intention of that part of the
moral government with which we are acquainted, to impress these
principles deeply on the human mind, and to induce the human race to
regulate their conduct accordingly. The laws, then, of this moral
government under which we find ourselves placed, and from which we
cannot escape, correspond with and corroborate the conclusions deduced
from the observation of mental phenomena. And from both we conclude that
similar principles of government will be adopted, (so far, at least, as
man is concerned,) in other worlds and in future ages; only more
developed, and therefore more evidently free from its present apparent
imperfections. Upon this account we look, in another life, for some such
general disclosure and consummation of the ways and wisdom of Providence
as shall vindicate, even in the minor details, the grand principles upon
which, generally speaking, the government of God is at present obviously
conducted. How this may be done, with many questions connected
therewith, reason without revelation could, as I conceive, do little
more than form plausible conjectures. Though now that it has pleased God
in Christ to bring “life and immortality to light through the Gospel,”
it is possible for reason to estimate the beauty and the mercy and the
wisdom of the dispensation by which it has been effected.
Creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness, and
power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to
perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him:
yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of
divine grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of
and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really
good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his
intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ
through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand,
esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is
made a partaker of this regeneration, or renovation, since he is
delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing, and doing that
which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of divine grace.”
Such were the sentiments of the often misrepresented Arminius on this
subject; to which is only to be added, to complete the Scriptural view,
that a degree of grace to consider his ways, and to return to God, is
through the merit of Christ vouchsafed to every man. Every one must be
conscious that he possesses free will, and that he is a free agent; that
is, that he is capable of considering and reflecting upon the objects
which are presented to his mind, and of acting, in such cases as are
possible, according to the determination of his will. And, indeed,
without this free agency, actions cannot be morally good or bad; nor can
the agents be responsible for their conduct. But the corruption
introduced into our nature by the fall of Adam has so weakened our
mental powers, has given such force to our passions, and such
perverseness to our wills, that a man “cannot turn and prepare himself
by his own natural strength and good works to faith and calling upon
God.” The most pious of those who lived under the Mosaic dispensation
often acknowledged the necessity of extraordinary assistance from God:
David prays to God to open his eyes, to guide and direct him; to create
in him a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within him, Psalm li, 10;
cxix, 18, 33, 35. Even we, whose minds are enlightened by the pure
precepts of the Gospel, and urged by the motives which it suggests, must
still be convinced of our weakness and depravity, and confess, in the
words of the tenth article, that “we have no power to do good works
pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God preventing us,
that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good
will.” The necessity of divine grace to strengthen and regulate our
wills, and to coöperate with our endeavours after righteousness, is
clearly asserted in the New Testament: “They that are in the flesh
cannot please God,” Rom. viii, 8. “Abide in me,” says our Saviour, “and
I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in
the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, and ye
are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth
forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing,” John xv, 4, 5. “No
man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him.”
“It is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good
pleasure,” Phil. ii, 13. “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to
think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God,” 2 Cor.
iii, 5. “We know not what to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit
helpeth our infirmities,” Rom. viii, 26. We are said to be “led by the
Spirit,” and to “walk in the Spirit,” Rom. viii, 14; Gal. v, 16, 25.
These texts sufficiently prove that we stand in need both of a
prevenient and of a coöperating grace. This doctrine we find asserted in
many of the ancient fathers, and particularly in Ambrose, who, in
speaking of the effects of the fall, uses these words: “Thence was
derived mortality, and no less a multitude of miseries than of crimes.
Faith being lost, hope being abandoned, the understanding blinded, and
the will made captive, no one found in himself the means of repairing
these things. Without the worship of the true God, even that which seems
to be virtue is sin; nor can any one please God without God. But whom
does he please who does not please God, except himself and Satan? The
nature therefore, which was good is made bad by habit: man would not
return unless God turned him.” And Cyprian says, “We pray day and night
that the sanctification and enlivening, which springs from the grace of
God, may be preserved by his protection.” Dr. Nicholls, after quoting
many authorities to show that the doctrine of divine grace always
prevailed in the catholic church, adds, “I have spent, perhaps, more
time in these testimonies than was absolutely necessary; but whatever I
have done is to show that the doctrine of divine grace is so essential a
doctrine of Christianity, that not only the Holy Scriptures and the
primitive fathers assert it, but likewise that the Christians could not
in any age maintain their religion without it,--it being necessary, not
only for the discharge of Christian duties, but for the performance of
our ordinary devotions.” And this seems to have been the opinion of the
compilers of our excellent liturgy, in many parts of which both a
prevenient and a coöperating grace is unequivocally acknowledged;
particularly in the second collect for the evening service; in the
fourth collect at the end of the communion service; in the collect for
Easter day; in the collect for the fifth Sunday after Easter; in the
collects for the third, ninth, seventeenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fifth
Sundays after Trinity. This assistance of divine grace is not
inconsistent with the free agency of men: it does not place them under
an irresistible restraint, or compel them to act contrary to their will.
Our own exertions are necessary to enable us to work out our salvation;
but our sufficiency for that purpose is from God. It is, however,
impossible to ascertain the precise boundary between our natural efforts
and the divine assistance, whether that assistance be considered as a
coöperating or a prevenient grace. Without destroying our character as
free and accountable beings, God may be mercifully pleased to counteract
the depravity of our hearts by the suggestions of his Spirit; but still
it remains with us to choose whether we will listen to those
suggestions, or obey the lusts of the flesh. We may rest assured that he
will, by the communication of his grace, varied often as to power and
distinctness, help our infirmities, invigorate our resolutions, and
supply our defects. The promises that if we draw nigh to God, God will
draw nigh to us, and pour out his Spirit upon us, James iv, 8; Acts ii,
17, and that he will give his Holy Spirit to every one that asketh him,
Luke xi, 13, imply that God is ever ready to work upon our hearts, and
to aid our well-doing through the powerful, though invisible, operation
of his Spirit: “The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the
sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth;
so is every one that is born of the Spirit,” John iii, 8. The joint
agency of God and man, in the work of human salvation, is pointed out in
the following passage: “Work out your own salvation with fear and
trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of
his good pleasure,” Phil, ii, 12, 13; and therefore we may assure
ourselves that free will and grace are not incompatible, though the mode
and degree of their coöperation be utterly inexplicable, and though at
different times one may appear for a season to overwhelm the other. This
doctrine has, however, been the subject of much dispute among
Christians: some sects contend for the irresistible impulses of grace,
and others reject the idea of any influence of the divine Spirit upon
the human mind. The former opinion seems irreconcilable with the free
agency of man, if held as the constant unvarying mode in which he
carries on his work in the soul of man, and the latter contradicts the
authority of Scripture; “and therefore,” says Veneer, “let us neither
ascribe nothing to free will, nor too much; let us not, with the
defenders of irresistible grace, deny free will, or make it of no
effect, not only before, but even under, grace; nor let us suffer the
efficacy of saving grace, on the other hand, to be swallowed up in the
strength and freedom of our wills; but, allowing the government or
superiority to the grace of God, let the will of man be admitted to be
its handmaid, but such a one as is free, and freely obeys; by which,
when it is freely excited by the admonitions of prevenient grace, when
it is prepared as to its affections, strengthened and assisted as to its
powers and faculties, a man freely and willingly coöperates with God,
that the grace of God be not received in vain.” “All men are also to be
admonished,” observes Cranmer, in his “Necessary Doctrine,” “and chiefly
preachers, that in this high matter they, looking on both sides, so
temper and moderate themselves, that they neither so preach the grace of
God that they take away thereby free will, nor on the other side so
extol free will, that injury be done to the grace of God.” And Jortin
remarks: “Thus do the doctrine of divine grace and the doctrine of free
will or human liberty unite and conspire, in a friendly manner, to our
everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith,
and humility; the second, to awaken our caution and quicken our
diligence.”
Many, indeed, relying on mere abstract arguments, deny free will, in the
strict meaning of the term, altogether, and define the mental faculties
of man according to their various fancies. But the existence and nature
of our moral and rational powers are and ought to be, in true
philosophy, the subject of mental observation, not the sport of
hypothesis. Those who love metaphysical abstractions may people the
worlds of their imagination with beings of whatsoever character they
prefer; but the nature and capabilities of man, as he really is, must be
determined not by speculation but by experience. It is true that this
experience is the object of consciousness, not of the senses; and,
accordingly, each man is, in some respect, the judge in his own case,
and may, if he chooses, deny his own freedom and his power of self
control, or of using those means which God hath appointed to lead to
this result. But this is seldom done in ordinary life, except by those
abandoned individuals who seek, in such a statement, an excuse for
capricious or unprincipled conduct,--an excuse which is never admitted
by the majority of reasoning persons, much less by the truly pious. The
latter, indeed, will always be found attributing any thing good they
achieve to the coöperating efficacy of superior assistance. But they
will, with equal sincerity, blame themselves for what they have done
amiss; or, in other words, acknowledge that they should and might have
willed and acted otherwise; and this is exactly the practical question,
the very turning point, on which the whole controversy hinges. The only
competent judges in such a question, says Dr. R. H. Graves, are those
who have made it the subject of mental observation, exertion, and
pursuit; or, in other words, those who have sought after righteousness,
under whatever dispensation, Acts x, 35; Romans ii, 7, 10. And surely
the confessions, the prayers, the repentance, and the sacrifices, of the
humble and pious of all ages show that they felt, not only that they
were themselves to blame for their actions, and therefore that they
might have done otherwise, that is, they had a free will, but that, to
make this will operative in spiritual matters, they required an aid
beyond the reach of mere human attainment. Some may fancy this statement
inconsistent in itself; and I allow that it cannot satisfy the mere
speculative supporters either of free will or its opponents. But to me
it seems the testimony of conscience and experience, which, in natural
religion, must, as I conceive, be preferred to abstract hypothesis. The
inquiry is not how the mind _may be_, but how it _is actually_,
constituted. This surely is a question of fact, not of conjecture, and
must therefore be decided by an appeal to common sense and experience,
not by random speculation. Again: even those who in theory contend for
the doctrine of necessity, yet in all the affairs of life where their
interests, comforts, or gratifications are concerned, both speak and act
as if they disbelieved it, and as if they really imagined themselves
capable of such self determination and self control, as to improve their
talents, their opportunities, and their acquirements, and so to exercise
a material influence on their worldly fortunes. But suppose the
assertions of individuals, as to their consciousness in this particular,
to disagree. It is then evident, that, the question being as to the
nature of man in general, it must be determined by the voice of
preponderating testimony. But how, it may be asked, are the suffrages to
be collected? Since the judgment of each individual must in this scheme
be considered as a separate fact, how is a sufficiently extensive
induction to be made? In answer, it may be asserted, that in every
civilized nation the induction has been already made, the suffrages have
been taken, the case has been tried, and the decision is on record. And
the verdict is the most impartial that can be looked for in such a case,
because given without any reference to the controversy in dispute. All
human laws, forbidding, condemning, and punishing vicious actions, are
grounded on the acknowledged supposition that man is possessed of a self
control, a self determining power, by which he could, both in will and
in deed, have avoided the very actions for which he is condemned, and in
the very circumstances in which he has committed them. Nor would it be
easy to find a case where the criminal has deceived himself, or hoped to
deceive his judges, by pleading that he laboured under a fatal
necessity, which rendered his crimes unavoidable, and therefore
excusable. The justice of all legislative enactments evidently and
essentially depends on the principle, that the things prohibited can be
avoided, or, in other words, might have been done otherwise than they
were done; and this is the very turning point of the controversy.
Accordingly, in whatever instances such freedom of will is not
presupposed, (as in the cases of idiots and madmen,) the operation of
such enactments is suspended. All nations, therefore, who consent to
frame and abide by such laws, do thereby testify their deliberate and
solemn assent to the truth of this principle, and, consequently, to the
existence of free will in man; and do certify the sincerity of their
conviction by staking upon it their properties, their liberties, and
their lives. Numberless other instances might be adduced in which the
practice of mankind implies their belief in this principle. And so
conscious of this are the opponents of free will, that they generally
deprecate appeals to common sense and experience, and resort to
metaphysical arguments to examine what is in truth a matter of truth,
not of conjecture; or, in other words, to determine, not what man is,
but what they imagine he _must be_. In their reasonings they differ, as
might have been expected, as much from each other as they do from truth
and reality. But the experience of common sense and conscience will
always decide, that no man can conscientiously make this excuse for his
crimes, that he could not have willed or acted otherwise than he did.
The existence of the above faculties in the human mind once acknowledged
leads, by necessary inference, to the admission, that there exists in
the great First Cause a power to create them. Not, indeed, that these
faculties themselves exist in him in the same manner as in us, but the
power of originating and producing them in all possible variety. We can
indeed conclude, that having created all these in us, his nature must be
so perfect that we cannot attribute to him any line of conduct
inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of these
faculties in ourselves. And therefore we cannot ascribe to him, as his
special act, any thing we should perceive to be unworthy of any just or
merciful, any wise or upright, being. But this furnishes no clue
whatever to a knowledge of the real constitution of his nature, or of
the manner in which his divine attributes exist together. In truth, we
no more comprehend how he wills than how he acts, and therefore we have
no better right to assert that he wills evil than that he does evil.
Again: we as little understand how he knows as how he sees, and
therefore might as well argue that all things exist in consequence of
his beholding them, as that all events arise in consequence of his
foreknowing them. In short, all that can be inferred by reason
concerning the intrinsic nature of the invisible, unsearchable Deity,
must be admitted by the candid inquirer to be no better than conjecture.
And he who should hope from such doubtful support as his fancied insight
into the unknown operations of the divine mind to suspend a system of
irrespective decrees, embracing the moral government of the world, would
but too much resemble him who should imagine the material globe
adequately sustained if upheld by a chain whose highest links were
wrapped in clouds and darkness. Thus our affirmative knowledge of the
Deity, as derived from this part of our inquiry, consists in the
certainty, (though his nature is unknown to us,) that he is the creative
source of all that is great, glorious, and good in heaven or in earth;
while we may negatively conclude, that his moral government shall, on
the whole, be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with whatever is
excellent in the exercise of power and wisdom, justice and mercy,
goodness and truth. Nor is it a little important, as connected with the
present inquiry, to keep in mind this distinction between our
affirmative and negative knowledge in this matter. For it shows us that
as, on the one side, we cannot pretend to such an insight into the
nature and character of the divine knowledge as to deduce therefrom a
system of eternal and irrespective decrees; so neither, on the other,
can this system of moral government be ascribed to the Deity, because it
would be manifestly unworthy, not merely of him who has created all
moral excellence, but of any of those beings on whom he has conferred
the most ordinary degrees of mercy and justice. The natural benefits or
evils arising out of moral or immoral practices are, in fact, so many
rewards or punishments, exhibiting the Being who has so constituted our
nature as a moral governor. This part of his government may not be so
clearly discernible in individual instances, because much of the
happiness and unhappiness attending virtue and vice is mental and
invisible. In the case of nations, however, considered merely as bodies
politic, the internal sanction of an approving or reproaching
conscience, of subdued or distracting passions, can have no existence;
and therefore the external sanctions are more uniformly enforced. Hence,
whoever carefully examines the dealings of Providence with the human
race will admit, that national prosperity has ever kept pace with
national wisdom and integrity; whereas, the greatest empires, when once
corrupted, have soon become the prey of internal strife or foreign
domination. Again: man is made for society, and cannot exist without it:
consequently, all the regulations which are really conducive to the
maintenance of civil policy and social order must be regarded as evident
consequences of our nature, when enlightened to the rational pursuit of
its own advantage; and therefore should be considered as intimations of
a moral government, carried on through their intervention. In addition
to which, it ought to be observed, that these laws may be regarded in
another point of view,--as a most important class of moral phenomena;
inasmuch as they virtually exhibit the most unexceptionable declarations
of reason on this subject, because they are collected from the common
consent of mankind, and therefore rendered, in a great measure,
independent of the obliquities of individual intellect, the errors of
private judgment, and the partial views of self interest, prejudice, or
passion. But all the laws of civilized nations, both in their enactment
and administration, not only presuppose certain notions concerning the
freedom and accountableness of man, the merit and demerit of human
actions, and the inseparable connection of virtue and vice with rewards
and punishments, but greatly contribute to fix and perpetuate these
notions. It is therefore evidently the intention of that part of the
moral government with which we are acquainted, to impress these
principles deeply on the human mind, and to induce the human race to
regulate their conduct accordingly. The laws, then, of this moral
government under which we find ourselves placed, and from which we
cannot escape, correspond with and corroborate the conclusions deduced
from the observation of mental phenomena. And from both we conclude that
similar principles of government will be adopted, (so far, at least, as
man is concerned,) in other worlds and in future ages; only more
developed, and therefore more evidently free from its present apparent
imperfections. Upon this account we look, in another life, for some such
general disclosure and consummation of the ways and wisdom of Providence
as shall vindicate, even in the minor details, the grand principles upon
which, generally speaking, the government of God is at present obviously
conducted. How this may be done, with many questions connected
therewith, reason without revelation could, as I conceive, do little
more than form plausible conjectures. Though now that it has pleased God
in Christ to bring “life and immortality to light through the Gospel,”
it is possible for reason to estimate the beauty and the mercy and the
wisdom of the dispensation by which it has been effected.